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EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER TO PROVE CONDUCT:
ILLUSION, ILLOGIC, AND INJUSTICE
IN THE COURTROOM
H. RIcHARD UVILLER t
The process of litigation is designed for the reconstruction of
an event that occurred in the recent past. And for the most part,
the rules by which a trial is conducted are supposed to enhance the
accuracy of the synthetic fact.1 Of course, the success of this enter-
prise, while not unknowable, will always be shrouded in uncer-
tainty. Those in a position to measure verity will forever disagree
and the rest of us will never be sure whose report to credit. Yet
the process continues, and lives by a faith in a collective intuition,
which is the genius of a system of law-by-development such as ours.
Fortunately, our faith in the mechanism of adjudication is not
unshakeable, and my purpose in this Article is gently to shake some
cherished assumptions concerning a group of evidentiary rules allo-
cating inferences from experience. A fuller description of my
thesis must await the setting of its underpinnings.
I. INTRODUCTION
The means by which our legal facsimile of truth is recreated is
the production of "evidence." In the United States, at least,2 elab-
f Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1951, Harvard University;
LL.B. 1953, Yale University. My gratitude is expressed to my good friend and
esteemed colleague, Professor Jon Waltz of Northwestern University School of Law,
for his careful editorial review of the draft, his valuable suggestions, and his words
of encouragement. I also acknowledge with thanks the assistance of Jonna Schuder,
Columbia Law 1981, who did research for the footnotes to this Article.
I Members of the Supreme Court have mentioned, from time to time, that a
major objective of litigation is to obtain a close correspondence between proven
fact and historical truth. Justice White, for one, is of this view. Writing for a
bare majority in United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980), he permitted the
use on cross-examination of a T-shirt previously suppressed as the product of an
unlawful search and seizure. He relied in part on Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62 (1954), and consistent later cases, writing that, in those cases, "the Court
stressed the importance of arriving at the truth in criminal trials." 446 U.S. at 626.
The wealth of other recent cases that have followed this homily indicates that it is
fast becoming a major theme of contemporary criminal jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hernandez, 646 F.2d 970, 974-78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 638 (1981); United States v. Rada-Solano, 625 F.2d 577, 579 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980); United States v. Hinckley, 529 F. Supp. 520,
522 (D.D.C. 1982).
2 It comes as a surprise to American lawyers and law students to discover that
a substantial number of highly developed legal systems-notably European-carry
on litigation quite comfortably without any discernible 'law of evidence." See
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orate rules have developed regarding what is evidence and what it
proves. For all the criticism of their many faults, the rules of proof
refuse to be blown away. Quite the contrary; federal codification,
followed with varying alacrity and enthusiasm by some states, has
added some support to many sagging beams of the common law
rules of evidence. At the same time, codification has enhanced the
visibility of numerous courtroom conventions, drawing interest and
focusing dispute. So, call our rules an ornamented baroque partita
on a two note theme ("probative" or "prejudicial"); call them an
arcane mythology (e.g., the hearsay exceptions); call them an unin-
telligible pastiche of meaningless obstacles to realistic fact-gathering
(e.g., the "best evidence rule" in a print-out world); call them a
needless invitation to lawyer-scholasticism at its stultifying worst
(e.g., the rule of privity of interest for adverse party admissions);
or sum them up as a vestige of elitist distrust of jury intelligence.
Hang whatever epithet on the rules you choose (most are richly
deserved)-evidence remains the language American lawyers speak.
And I suspect the reason is not merely force of communal habit or
the need for a professional tongue, though both are important.
Although its dogma sometimes receives only a nod of recognition
in the courtroom, I believe evidence remains alive in American
legal parlance and thought because the rules express some usable
ideas about one of the main concerns of the lawyer: the establish-
ment of a fact as true.
We are all in the proof business, one way or another. As we
assemble our evidence, we usually adopt the footprint theory of
how to show who passed by. According to this theory, the past is
preserved in the present by altered surfaces of matter and mind.
It is a good theory because it takes as its major premise an un-
doubted and common occurrence. Ordinary experience teaches
generally R. ScmSiNcGER, CoMPTAArAn LAW (3d ed. 1970). Casually, at least,
continental lawyers attribute their open proof mode to the absence of lay juries.
It also may reflect a considerably more muted tradition of adversary contention
compared to that which characterizes the domestic litigation process. See 9
J. WIMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TU I.LS AT COMMON LAw § 2483 (Chadbourn rev. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as WiGmoRE]; Goodhart, A Changing Approach to the Law of
Evidence, 51 VA. L. REV. 759 (1965); Kunert, Some Observations on the Origin
and Structure of Evidence Rules Under the Common Law System and the Civil
Law System of "Free Proof" in the German Code of Criminal Procedure, 16
BUFFALO L. REV. 122 (1966); Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal
Procedures in Europe and America, 48 HARv. L. REv. 433 (1935). Although the
Mother Common Law country employs evidentiary conventions resembling many
of our own, see J. MAG;umE, J. WEINsTEIN, J. CHADRBOURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES
AND MATERuALs ON EVIDENCE (6th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as MAvmrE],
neither the British nor the Canadians have developed nearly so complex or so
important a set of rules and law governing proof as we have.
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that events frequently do leave durable marks in the physical world
and imprints on the minds of witnesses. Detect, inspect, collect,
and resurrect these little dues, then, and the truth is proved. The
apt image of the factual or evidentiary side of the law is Holmes
(Sherlock, here, not O.W., Jr.) peering through his hand lens at
the telltale scratch.
Of course, not every trace is fixed in form or unambiguous in
significance. Evidence from human witnesses, for example, must
be received with special caution because, as we all know, initial
perception may have been incomplete or inaccurate, memory is
sometimes fluid, and recitation may be consciously or unconsciously
skewed. Even inanimate objects-in themselves, in their location,
or in the marks they bear-may provide evidence consistent with
more than one version of the happenings in which they were in-
volved or affected. Yet the miracle of proof is that, by gathering
and putting together enough evidentiary traces, ambiguities can be
canceled, distortions can be revealed and discounted, and a fair
similitude of the past event can be achieved.3
In sum, the predominant theory of evidence holds that nothing
passes in this world without leaving a trace, and current phenomena,
properly sorted and compiled, speak clearly of earlier events. It
works for archeologists and paleontologists; it works for us. It is
not, however, the thesis to which I wish to devote attention here.
Apart from evidence admitted for the trace of an event, the
truth-seeker may consider certain facts for their value as predictors
of behavior or events. The probity of this second category of evi-
dence is based upon the common concurrence or predictable re-
currence of certain events or behavioral patterns. To illustrate:
the trace method of proving that a nail was struck by a hammer is
to examine the head of the nail and there discover the trace of a
hammer blow. Another way is to establish that a certain person,
being a carpenter, has frequently hit nails with his hammer and,
having had the opportunity and motive to do so, he probably
struck the nail in question. Rather than looking back from the
effect to its probable cause, predictive reasoning looks forward from
an established event or trait to predict the likely repetition of its
occurrence, or future conduct consistent with the observed char-
acter of the actor. Thus, the governing assumption is something
like this: habits persist, events recur in familiar form, and the
- As with most miracles, belief requires a bit of faith. But old trial hands
generally agree that, despite the weakness of any individual piece of proof, the
trace evidence as a whole, wrung out by the customary trial process, usually
presents a reliable picture of the event in issue.
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peculiarity of individuality continues to identify the actor in suc-
cessive transactions.
4
Predictive evidence is really no alien in the land of conven-
tional modes of proof by traces and residues. In a logical sense,
predictive evidence is the primal ancestor of the more familiar
genus. Consider: why is the footprint relevant to the foot's passage?
Having observed feet pressed into smooth wet sand, having observed
muddy shoes walking on clean floors, having had a variety of ex-
perience with similar events involving the track of feet, we are
prepared to say that, because a foot pressed to a surface will leave
a characteristic imprint, therefore such a print was in all likelihood
made by a foot. Thus, while we appear to be reasoning backward
from the trace, we are actually applying experience with many
half-forgotten similar events that have taught us to expect co-exist-
ing or sequential phenomena. It is, in short, the predictive lesson
of experience that accords validity to judicial retrospective reasoning.
Outside of the courtroom, of course, we make judgments every
day based on associative or predictive assumptions. Indeed, many
of us spend more time than we should finely analyzing character in
order to guess at the behavior of others. The comment, "I'm sure
he did it; it's just the sort of thing he would do," is so common it
passes without notice as a system of proof. So, too, we all think it
sensible to lock the office door after the typewriter is stolen from
the office next door. Because we all believe that people act pre-
dictably according to character, should not proof of character be
admitted in court to demonstrate expected conduct? And if our
pooled experience leads us to expect repetitions of characteristic
conduct, why should we not treat a prior similar action as evidence
of the behavior in question? Proof, in court at least, is supposed
to be a matter for the application of ordinary intelligence, and
any rule in derogation of common sense requires special justification.
The law, I shall argue, has been particularly squeamish about
predictive evidence; the result has been uncertain, inconsistent, and
ill-defined rules. The response of the common law is best sum-
4 My definition of "predictive" evidence covers two specific forms of proof
which I do not intend to discuss in these pages: evidence of habit or routine, and
evidence of prior similar happening. In my view, both share with character evi-
dence the assumptions described in the text. The governing rules, however, are
not altogether harmonious. Personal habit, inappropriately linked with institutional
routine by Federal Rule of Evidence 406, is welcomed as proof of particular conduct
in conformity. Prior events similar to the one in issue are not treated explicitly by
the federal rules, and the case law is fluid. The admissibility of the evidence
appears to be controlled by general rules of relevancy. See McCoRMICK's HAND-
BOOK OF TnE LAW OF EvIDmNcr §§ 196-200 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as McCoRMIcK].
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marized as: "Yes and no. For some purposes, in some sorts of cases,
under some conditions, perhaps." 5 The Federal Rules of Evidence
do not handle the matter much better."
II. THE RuLEs GOVERNING -THE METHODS OF, PROVING CHARACTER
A. In General
In the simplified lexicon of evidence law, "character" may be
understood to be a collection of "traits," each a self-contained packet
of potential conduct consistent with previously observed reactions
to events, people, or things.7 These behavioral fragments are
organized according to our English vocabulary; .the items of be-
havior composing each trait cluster about a common descriptive
term such as "forgetful," "aggressive," or "honest." By our care-
less usage, many of these linguistic boxes have lost their integrity.
A term thought to describe a discrete and persistent element of
personality, such as "law-abiding" or "cautious," may arise from a
wide range of behavioral events or attitudes, and affords only the
crudest index for the prediction of a given act consistent with it.
The semantic problem of precision and narrowness in the categori-
zation of character traits may be an important feature in the re-
luctance of the law of evidence to appreciate the value of character
evidence; as such it deserves further attention, which I shall attempt
to lavish upon it further along.
Character or a character trait is normally proved by one of
three available means: reputation, specific manifestation, and some-
times, opinion.8 Reputation evidence is adduced by asking a wit-
ness acquainted with the community view of the subject to report
on the general regard.9 In the second mode, the witness is per-
mitted to recount otherwise unconnected incidents in which the
subject behaved in a manner exhibiting the characteristic in ques-
5 See, e.g., McCoRmIcn, supra note 4, § 186; Udall, Character Proof in the
Law of Evidence-A Summary, 18 U. CiN. L. REV. 283 (1949).
6 See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 403-405.
7 Character is defined as "[t~he aggregate of the moral qualities which belong
to and distinguish an individual person; the general result of the [sic] one's dis-
tinguishing attributes." BLAck's LAW DicIoNAny 211 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
8 FED. R. EviD. 405; 1 S. GnsENLAF, A TREATISE ON nH LAW OF EVmENCE
9 14c, 461a-d (16th ed. 1899) [hereinafter cited as GP.EENLnAF]; McConMircK,
supra note 4, § 186; 3A WIGMoRE, supra note 2, § 920 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
9 See FED. B. Evm. 405 advisory committee note. When reputation testimony
is offered, the reputation may be that in the general community in which the person
resides or that among a group of associates. See United States v. Oliver, 492 F.2d
943 (8th Cir. 1974), appeal after remand, 525 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976).
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tion.1.0 By opinion evidence, we mean simply that a witness may
recite his own opinion of the subject's character as to the relevant
trait."
Although the probative value of evidence of specific acts ex-
hibiting the trait in question is probably superior to proof by
either of the other two modes,12 it is also thought to be most dis-
tracting and time consuming.13 Both the contemporary common
law 14 and the federal rules,15 therefore, bar proof of character in
this manner, except for those cases in which character itself con-
stitutes a substantive issue, or, for impeachment purposes, when
the proof is by previous conviction.16 The rule against demon-
stration of character by prior conduct, however, does not preclude
the cross-examination of a witness, who is giving evidence of char-
acter by reputation or opinion, concerning specific behavior of the
subject tending to contradict the witness's expressed belief concern-
10 Under FED. R. EviD. 405(a), specific instances of relevant conduct may only
be brought out on cross-examination, see United States v. Reese, 568 F.2d 1246
(6th Cir. 1977), unless character is "an essential element of a charge, claim, or
defense." FED. R. Evw. 405(b). A reputation or opinion witness may only be
asked either "if he knows" or "has heard" of the specific acts. See FED. R. Evm.
405 advisory committee note; McCoRmicK, supra note 4, § 191, at 457 n.74. Rele-
vant specific acts are not limited to instances resulting in conviction. United States
v. Edwards, 549 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Lewis, 482 F.2d 632
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
11 The witness must first establish familiarity with the person before testifying
as to an opinion. See Virgin Islands v. Petersen, 553 F.2d 324 (3d Cir. 1977);
Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 173-74 (1940).
12 As I shall argue below, see infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text, proof
of observed conduct that is idiosyncratic or habitual provides the strongest reason
to expect its recurrence as a demonstrated behavioral characteristic of the subject.
If sufficiently similar in nature of circumstances to the conduct in issue, the prior
behavior tends to establish the successive act. By contrast, both reputation and
opinion concerning character are often diffuse and necessarily highly interpretive
formulations of unreliable data from unknown sources.
'3 See FED. R. Evw. 405 advisory committee note. See generally Kuhns, The
Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IowA L.
REv. 777 (1981).
14 Against the criminal defendant, particular acts or misconduct were inadmis-
sible to show bad character. 1 G NEAF, supra note 8, § 461(b); 1 WIoMORE,
supra note 2, § 193 (3d ed. 1940).
Against other witnesses, until the 1700's, the common law permitted a witness
to testify about the specific acts of another witness. Comment on specific acts
flowed naturally from the witness's opinion testimony. During the early 1700's,
both English and American courts began excluding specific conduct evidence
because it was confusing, time-consuming, and unfairly surprising. Id. § 979
(Chadbourn rev. 1970).
15 FED. R. Evrn. 405 permits the use of specific conduct evidence on cross-
examination and when character is an essential element of a charge, claim, or
defense. FED. R. Evm. 608 limits the use of specific conduct evidence other than
conviction of a crime to the cross-examination of a witness concerning truthfulness
and, even then, gives the court discretion to admit or exclude such evidence. See
supra note 10.
16 See infra notes 59-109 and accompanying text; FaD. R. Evm. 608-609.
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ing the trait in question.1 7  Mercifully, these oddities of trial
mechanics need not concern us greatly. It is enough to know that
all three modes of proof are acceptable under some circumstances:
proof by reputation is the most generally acceptable (and probably
the least valuable), proof by opinion is making a strong comeback
(thanks no doubt to Wigmore's view of it),' 8 and conduct (the most
probative) is the most sharply limited.
Be not misled, however, by the law's provision for the several
means by which character may be proved. The prevailing response
of the law and legal scholars to such evidence has been decidedly
unfriendly. 19 In general, character may not be proved in order to
17FED. R. Evm. 405(a) and 608(b) specify that cross-examination may be
permitted regarding specific conduct. In Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469
(1948), the Supreme Court approved the prosecution's questioning the defendant's
character witnesses about the defendant's prior arrest. As a basis for this result,
the Supreme Court explained that the prosecution must be allowed to test the
qualifications of the character witness. If the witness had not heard of the arrest,
reasoned the Court, he might not be well qualified to testify as to general reputa-
tion. Id. 483; see also McCouncr, supra note 4, § 191, at 456-57 & n.73.
Is Wigmore argues strongly for a return to the use of opinion evidence instead
of reputation evidence:
The Anglo-American rules of evidence have occasionally taken some curious
twistings in the course of their development; but they have never done
anything so curious in the way of shutting out evidential light as when
they decided to exclude the person who knows as much as humanly can
be known about the character of another, and have still admitted the
secondhand, irresponsible product of multiplied guesses and gossip which
we term "reputation."
7 WicMoRE, supra note 2, § 1986 (Chadbourn rev. 1978) (footnote omitted).
Greenleaf similarly expressed a preference for proof by opinion rather than by
reputation evidence: "It is to be regretted that the orthodox practice [using opinion
testimony] has been departed from, for it furnished the most satisfactory mode of
learning a witness' character." 1 GnEENLmx, supra note 8, § 461(c).
Early English common law preferred the use of opinion evidence to establish
character. The witness testified to his or her personal belief, based on personal
knowledge, about the character of the defendant or other witness. Testimony
concerning particular acts was generally not permitted, although it was more likely
to be admitted concerning the defendant than a witness.
American courts took the opposite path, relying on reputation evidence rather
than personal opinion to prove moral character. Wigmore attributes this divergence
to a misunderstanding of English precedent which was given credence by Chief
Justice Swift of Connecticut in his treatise on evidence in 1810. 7 WiGMoBE,
supra note 2, §§ 1981-1985 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). In Michelson, 335 U.S. at
475-87, the Supreme Court discussed the inconsistencies and illogic of the common
law rules, but declined to change them. See supra note 17.
19 FED. R. Evm. 404 explicitly states: "Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion .... "
Scholars and courts continually accept and justify this rule. Wigmore claims
that the bar on propensity evidence to show that the defendant acted in accordance
with character has been so often repeated as to be "commonplace." 1 WiGMoRE,
supra note 2, § 192 (3d ed. 1940). Similarly, in People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y.
264, 291, 61 N.E. 286, 293 (1901), the court notes:
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establish conduct consistent therewith. A number of exceptions to
this rule of rejection provide the element of anomaly that we shall
seek here to explore. First, however, let us put aside one obvious
case sometimes mistakenly classified as an exception.
Occasionally, some trait of character is directly in issue as a
substantive element of a charge, claim, or defense, and character
evidence of the "trace" variety is received to establish the trait in
question.20 If, for example, a plaintiff sues the defendant for defa-
mation by having called the plaintiff a swindler and a thief, the
plaintiff must prove that honesty and fair dealing were his true
characteristics, while the defendant may wish to show larcenous
traits. Direct proof of the character fact in issue may be had from
witnesses upon whom the plaintiff's character had left its mark,
one way or another. People who knew the plaintiff may state their
opinions of his character with respect to honesty in financial matters;
those who knew his reputation in this regard may report it; and
(in a pretty inversion of the conduct-character inference) some
jurisdictions 21 and the federal rules 22 will permit witnesses to recite
instances of the plaintiff's unrelated financial dealings from which
the character trait in issue might be inferred.
These direct or circumstantial trace-proofs of the trait of char-
acter itself, as the substantive fact in issue, do not concern us here.
The general rule of evidence applicable to criminal trials is that the state
cannot prove against a defendant any crime not alleged in the indictment,
either as a foundation for a separate punishment, or as aiding the proofs
that he is guilty of the crime charged. . . . This rule, so universally
recognized and so firmly established in all English-speaking lands, is rooted
in that jealous regard for the liberty of the individual ....
Greenleaf concurs, citing unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues as the reasons
justifying the rule. 1 GREaNLAF, supra note 8, § 14a-b. McCormick also notes
the persistence of this rule and its underlying policies: "The reason for the general
rule is that character when used for this purpose is not essential as it is when
character is the issue, and generally it comes with too much dangerous baggage
of prejudice, distraction from the issues, time consumption, and hazard of surprise."
McCoRm¢cE:, supra note 4, § 188, at 445 (footnote omitted).
2 0 See 1 Wi GmoRE, supra note 2, § 54 (3d ed. 1940); see also 1 GszNrAF,
supra note 8, § 14(d) (Character is often, by the substantive law of the case, a
part of the issue, and is not used as tending to prove any other fact. In such a
case, the admission involves only a question of that substantive law, and not a
question of evidence.).
21 McComic], supra note 4, § 187 (proof by specific acts allowed in many
common law jurisdictions; such evidence is most likely to create prejudice and
hostility, but is also most probative).
22 Fan. R. Evm. 405(b) ("In cases in which character or a trait of character
of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also
be made of specific instances of conduct."); see also 1 WirmoRE, supra note 2,
§ 202 (3d ed. 1940) (justifying specific conduct evidence when character is in
issue by noting that the problems of undue prejudice, unfair surprise (to a degree),
and confusion of issues are less present; also emphasizing the practical necessity
for allowing the use of such evidence).
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Instead, we focus on the rule disallowing proof of a person's char-
acter as an intermediate evidentiary fact from which an ultirmate
fact in issue-the person's conduct-may. be inferred.23  Here, we
discover three true exceptions to the general .ban that may be of
interest: The first permits some proof of pertinent traits of char-
acter in criminal cases; the second addresses character evidence as
a means of impeaching a witness's credibility; and the third is a
special purposes exception deserving particularly close scrutiny.
B. Criminal Trial Exceptions
1. Character of the Defendant
As a true exception to the rule against the proof of conduct
by inference from character, a criminal defendant traditionally may
prove a trait in his own character from which the factfinder might
derive a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged
criminal act.24 The trait itself is proved, of course, by some trace
method. But its relevance is found in the assessment that its estab-
lishment makes less likely the occurrence of the specific item of
behavior attributed to the defendant either by the indictment or by
the witnesses against him. Logically, therefore, the trait of character
offered by the defendant should be closely or strongly related to
the criminal behavior in issue: the conduct charged to the defend-
ant must be thought a very rare occurrence in persons of the de-
scribed character.25 For example, a defendant accused of larceny
by fraud or deceit may submit proof that he is reported or believed
23 Some writers refer to this use of character evidence as "circumstantial."
See, e.g., McCoumrc,, supra note 4, § 188, at 444. -While I can appreciate the
use of the term in the sense of "indirect," I think there is some possible confusion
because character directly in issue may also be-and indeed, is normally-proved
"circumstantially."
24 See, e.g., United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1977); FED. R.
Evm. 404(a)(1). Wigmore explains: "A defendant's character, then, as indicating
the probability of his doing or not doing the act charged, is essentially relevant."
1 WiGMorE, supra note 2, §55, at 450 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original).
Because the policy considerations of confusion of the issues, unfair surprise, and
undue prejudice are not present with regard to the defendant's character, Wigmore
concludes that a defendant may always offer evidence of good character. Id.
§§ 55-56; see 2 J. WE NssTE N & M. BEaGE, WEINSrmmN's EVIDENCE 5 404[5]
(1981) (accused has an absolute right to introduce character evidence) [hereinafter
cited as WEINSTEIN]. Note, however, that the evidence offered by the defendant
of a pertinent trait must be either by opinion or reputation testimony; proof of
specific instances is allowed only on cross-examination. FED. R. Evm. 405(a).
25 McCormick states that "[a] few courts permit proof of "general good char-
acter" but the prevailing and more practical view limits the inquiry to the trait or
traits involved in the crime on trial-honesty in theft cases, peaceableness in
murder, and the like." McCommcx, supra note 4, § 191, at 455 (footnotes omitted).
The advisory committee's citation to McCormick indicates its intention that Fan. R.
Evm. 404 be so limited. FED. R. Evm. 404 advisory committee note.
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to be open and honest in dealings concerning money and property.
Having elected to submit proof of this sort, of course, the defendant
will not be heard to object to rebuttal evidence of the same nature-
albeit to contrary effect-adduced against him.
26
Thus, subject only to the restriction that the trait to be proved
be inconsistent with the conduct charged, the criminal defendant
becomes the only person in court entitled to benefit from the ordi-
nary understanding that behavior springs from the nest of person-
ality. The defendant in a criminal case is likely to be seeking a
negative inference, to be sure, but the process of reasoning to a
negative conclusion is no different than to the positive. The de-
fendant, by showing his traits of caution and sensitivity to conse-
quences, asks the factfinder to infer that he did not act with reckless
indifference to human life on the occasion in question. The logic
is obvious: the character trait of "cautious" is assigned by repeated
observation of various incidents in which the subject demonstrated
what most of us would term careful conduct; add the assumption
that such examples truly represent a central trait of character that
will dictate future behavior of the same sort, given the appropriate
circumstances for it; Q.E.D.-he would not have acted recklessly on
the occasion in issue. If the prosecutor seeks to respond by proving
the traits of negligence and thoughtlessness to obtain the positive
inference the element of proof demands, he does so by means of
the identical logical chain, but may do so responsively only.
Just why the defendant in a criminal case should enjoy the
exceptional opportunity to disprove alleged conduct by evidence of
his own good character is far from clear.27 It is not that a person's
reputed trait of attentive care might not have some bearing on a
charge of reckless endangerment. It might be highly probative.2
But surely no more so than it would be in a suit rather than a
prosecution for gross negligence. Despite the tempting analogy, it
probably cannot be truly said that the exception derives from the
ancient trials by oath and compurgation, 29 for it seems clear that
26 See FED. I. Evm. 4 04(a)(1); United States v. Davenport, 449 F.2d 696
(5th Cir. 1971).27 See Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters,
70 YAL L.J. 763, 780 (1961).
28 See McConMIcK, supra note 4, § 188.
29 Trial by oath consisted of the sworn statement of denial by the defendant
(or sworn statement by the plaintiff denying the defendant's affirmative plea).
In trial by compurgation, the defendant produced "oath-helpers," or compurgators,
to attest to his or her veracity. The compurgators simply swore that they believed
the defendant to be telling the truth. They were neither required nor expected
to testify about the underlying facts. This method of trial was also called trial by
wager of law. See 3 W. BLACKSroNE, CoM-NTvmrAms ON Tm LAws OF ENGLAND
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evidence of good character for veracity was admitted to support
the sworn denials of a party in a civil suit as well as the criminal
defendant. 0 So too, the restriction of the exception to character
of the defendant himself seems illogical. The critical issue in a
defense of a civil or criminal trial may be the conduct of a person
other than the defendant, and evidence relating to this person's
character may be highly relevant. If the state alleges, for example,
that an uncharged coconspirator or a severed accomplice harbored
the defendant and assisted his escape, the defendant may wish to
show that the person in question had the reputation of a law-abid-
ing person or perhaps had on other occasions assisted in the capture
of fleeing felons. By what tenable theory is this line of defense
closed? About the best one can do with this puzzle is to guess that
somewhere, somehow the rule was relaxed to allow the criminal
defendant .with so much at stake and so little available in the way
of conventional proof to have special dispensation to tell the fact-
finder just what sort of person he really is.31 Unfortunately, dis-
pensations of this sort do little to improve the logical coherence
of the rule, however charitably intended.
2. Character of the Victim
The special considerations of criminal defense permitting the
defendant to assert his own good character are not sufficient justi-
fications for the other half of the exception applicable to criminal
cases: the defendant may also prove "pertinent traits" of the victim's
character,3 2 despite the fact that such proof of the victim's bad
character may damage a person who has not voluntarily "'plac[ed]
his [or her] character in issue.' "33 By "pertinent," we can prob-
ably assume that the federal rule means "relevant" (though what
nuance they sought to convey by shifting the term, I cannot guess),
341-44 (4th ed. 1770); 2 F. PoLuocK & F. MArrLAND, THE HSTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BSTORE T Tm oF EDwAnD I 601 n.2 (2d ed. 1952) (noting the last
reported case of trial by compurgation to be King v. Williams, 9 Eng. Rep. 167
(1824)).
3oTrial by compurgation, unlike its surviving descendant, was not limited to
criminal cases. Indeed, Blackstone implies that trial by oath was not permitted in
certain criminal cases, at least not those relating to force or violence. See W. Br.Acx-
STONE, supra note 29, at 346. But see F. PoLLOcK & F. MAIMAND, supra note 29,
at 635.
31 See FED. R. Evm. 404(a) advisory committee note.
-32 FED. R. Evm. 404(a) (2) permits the accused to offer evidence of a pertinent
trait of character of the victim. See also 1 GnEiLEAF, supra note 8, § 14(b);
1 WIrMoRE, supra note 2, §§ 198-200 (3d ed. 1940).
33 While this phrase is often used in "courtroom parlance," it is misleading.
See McConMrcK, supra note 4, § 191, at 454-55.
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and by "relevant" the old rule meant some characteristic mode of
behavior that, had the victim acted in accord therewith, would
have diminished or cancelled the culpability of the defendant.
Thus (theoretically, at least) 34 a defendant accused of bribing a
public official might show that the official in question had exhibited
the trait of greed or abuse of power in order to advance a defense
of extortion. Perhaps a person accused of "joyriding" might be
able to prove the owner's characteristic trait of generosity to sup-
port his claim that he was operating the car with the permission
of the owner. Among the many examples of "pertinent" traits,
two deserve special mention, for they are at once the most com-
monly cited and, in many ways, the strangest.
a. For Aggression
By ancient and common usage, a person defending a charge of
physical aggression-from assault to homicide-may prove that his
victim was a quarrelsome or violent person to support the claim
of self-defense.m This evidence might support the inference that
the defendant had reason to be fearful of the victim or that the
victim might have been the first aggressor in the disputed incident.
The main point of divergence among the jurisdictions seems to be
whether, to be admissible, the victim's aggressive reputation had to
be known to the defendant.36 The majority view is that the char-
acteristic is relevant regardless of the defendant's appreciation of
it. 37 For our purposes, the significance of this view is that it most
clearly illustrates the foundation of relevance, to wit: evidence of
character tends to prove conduct (that is, initial aggression against
34 Although the common law rule is as broad as FED. R. Evm. 404(a)(2), it
is difficult to find examples of the use of a victim's character in any cases except
homicide/assault and rape. See Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 571 (1965); Annot., 140
A.L.R. 364 (1942).
35 See McCoRmiCK, supra note 4, § 193; 2 WEmrsTmN, supra note 24, 11404
[06]; 1 WimORE, supra note 2, § 63 (3d ed. 1940). Each of these treatises speaks
primarily of using evidence of the victim's character in homicide cases. Although
use in homicide cases is emphasized, use is apparently also permitted in assault
cases. See Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 571, 577 (1965).
36 Wigmore distinguishes between evidence of the victim's violent character to
prove that he acted in conformance in the specific incident and evidence of the
communication of the victim's character for violence to show the reasonableness of
the defendant's apprehension of violence. For the former, knowledge by the de-
fendant is unnecessary. For the latter, knowledge clearly is essential to the claim.
1 WicMoas, supra note 2, § 63 (3d ed. 1940). McCormick makes the same
distinction. McComIcE, supra note 4, § 193, at 961 n.99.
3 7 McCoRM C,, supra note 4, § 193. McCormick writes: "It is almost univer-
sally held that when such evidence [that the accused had attacked first] has been
produced the accused may introduce testimony of the reputation of the deceased
for turbulence and violence." Id. § 193, at 461 (footnote omitted).
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the defendant) in accord therewith. The minority, while admitting
the evidence to show that the defendant, knowing the aggressive
reputation of the victim, might have been fearfully apprehensive,
nonetheless disavows the relevance of the evidence of character as
proof of actual aggressive conduct by the victim on the occasion
at issue. A New York court, for example, states: "Such evidence
is not received to show that the deceased was the aggressor, for if
competent for that purpose, similar evidence could be given as to
the reputation of the defendant as bearing on the probability that
he was the aggressor." 38 The Federal Rules of Evidence, it might
be noted, are squarely aligned with the majority rule; because the
victim's aggressiveness is clearly "pertinent" to a defense of respon-
sive attack, the federal rules classify it as an enumerated exception
to the rule against the use of character evidence to prove consistent
conduct.3 9
Rule 404(a)(2) goes somewhat further. In the highly particular
instance of a homicide prosecution in which defense evidence has
been offered that the victim was the "first aggressor," the prosecu-
ion may offer evidence that the victim was "peaceful" by tempera-
ment. The exception relating to the character of the victim is
thereby extended because the evidence of character may come from
the state in the first instance, rather than as rebuttal for evidence
of the same nature first presented by the defense. Presumably, the
extension is deemed acceptable for the special reason that in such
cases, the dead victim is not available to attest to his own peaceable
behavior during the encounter in question. Be that as it may, we
note that the federal rule's extended exception allows for the ad-
mission of proof that the victim acted in accordance with certain
character traits during the incident in question.
b. For Unchastity
Until recently, a second classic example of the permissible
proof of character by a criminal defendant to prove conduct con-
sistent therewith was the exception extended to the man defending
against a charge of rape by alleging consent of the victim. As
originally adopted, the federal rules contemplated admitting a de-
fendant's evidence of the victim's character, 40 and the advisory
38 People v. Rodawald, 177 N.Y. 408, 423, 70 N.E. 1, 5-6 (1907).
39FED. R. Evm. 404 (a)(2). But see infra notes 40-52 and accompanying
text (discussion of FED. R. Evm. 412 modifying general rule for rape victims).
40 It is difficult (and fortunately moot) to describe just how the original formu-
lation would have defined "pertinent traits" of the rape victim's character. We
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committee's note so states.41 Three years later, however, the as-
sumptions underlying that rule were seriously reconsidered, 42 with
the result that the federal rules, 43 as well as other coded and un-
coded versions of the rule,44 have been replaced by a rather com-
plex formulation.
45
In brief, rule 412, governing both the admissibility of evidence
of the rape victim's character and permissible modes of proof, pro-
hibits the introduction of reputation or opinion evidence concern-
ing the rape victim's past sexual behavior.46  Specific conduct
evidence is also excluded, except in three situations. Specific con-
duct evidence may be admitted to show that someone other than
the defendant was the source of semen or injury -7 or, on the issue
of consent, to show that the victim previously had engaged in sexual
behavior with the defendant.4  Finally, specific conduct is admis-
sible when exclusion would violate the defendant's constitutional
rights. 49 - During congressional debate, Congressman Mann ex-
plained this exception: "The first circumstance is where the Con-
suppose that in a bygone era, words like chastity or promiscuity had clear meaning
and obvious relevance to the issue of whether a woman had consented to sexual
penetration on the occasion in issue. Although possible, it seems unlikely that the
same set of assumptions guided the draftsmen of the Federal Rules of Evidence
in an era of "loose morals," when such labels may not be as probative on the issue
of sexual choice in a given situation. As originally formulated, the rule and accom-
panying note give no hint whether an accused rapist could support his defense of
consent by showing that the victim had the trait or reputation of a multi-lovered
woman, a sexual adventuress, or what. See FED. R. Evm. 404(a)(2) & advisory
committee note. While speculation on the matter is possible, it is unnecessary to
reach a conclusion, thanks to the sound-though tardy-work of reform. See FED.
R. Evm. 412.
4 1 FED. R. EvnD. 404(a)(2) advisory committee note ("an accused may intro-
duce pertinent evidence of the character of the victim, as in support of a claim
of ... consent in a case of rape").
42 The lobbying efforts of feminist groups have generally been seen as the
cause of this sudden awakening of legislative sensitivity. See Berger, Man's Trial,
Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 31-32
(1977). The critical comments of scholars also may have precipitated this change.
See, e.g., Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Un-
lamented Death of Character for Chastity, 63 Comqrs.L L. REv. 90 (1977).
4 3Congress enacted FED. R. Evm. 412, restricting the use of the victim's past
sexual behavior in a rape trial, on October 28, 1978, making it applicable to trials
beginning more than thirty days after that date. See Privacy Protection for Rape
Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-540, § 3, 92 Stat. 2046.
44 For a compilation of state statutes and commentary on their various formu-
lations, see Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amend-
ment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544 (1980).
4 5 See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 412.
4 6 FED. R. EvD. 412(a).
4 7 
FED. R. EvD. 412(b)(2)(A).
4 8 
FED. R. Ev. 412(b)(2)(B).
4 9 FED. R. Evm. 412(b)(1).
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stitution requires that the evidence be admitted. This exception
is intended to cover those infrequent instances where, because of
an unusual chain of circumstances, the general rule of inadmis-
sibility, if followed, would result in denying the defendant a
constitutional right." 50
I find the Congressman's comment as mystifying as the pro-
vision itself. What could he, and the drafters, have had in mind?
The only constitutional right to proof that I am aware of comes
through the sixth amendment's confrontation clause, understood to
mean full cross-examination. 51  Other constitutional rights-notably
to the assistance of counsel, to compulsory process, and to a fair
trial-yield readily to ordinary rules of evidence precluding admis-
sibility. Surely, Congress did not mean by this proviso that the
constitutional right to cross-examination entitles the rape defendant
to ask his victim about her prior sexual activities as conduct evi-
dencing character relevant to consent. Such a construction would
have returned the law to the point where it was under rule 404(a)(2).
In a sense, the whole point of the enactment of rule 412 was to
change the law of relevancy concerning "sexual character." If
Congress believed-and correctly believed-that the constitutional
right of confrontation overcomes such legislative modifications of
the rule of relevancy, the position spells serious trouble for the law
of character evidence, and indeed for many other provisions of the
federal rules as applied to defendants in criminal cases. I prefer
to believe that the proviso contemplated no such sweeping inter-
pretation of the right to confrontation. And I am fortified in my
belief by Congressman Mann's assurance that the clause in rule 412
would apply only in rare cases.
5 2
00 124 CONG. cEc. H11,944 (daily ed. Oct 10, 1978).
Even where evidence would be admitted under one of the exceptions, FED. R.
EvID. 412(c)(3) gives the court power to exclude it if its prejudicial value out-
weighs its probative value. See 124 CONG. REC. H1,945 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1978)
(statement of Congresswoman Holtzman, drafter of FED. R. EvID. 412). The rule
also details stringent notice requirements and a pretrial hearing procedure. FED.
R. Evm. 412(c)(1)-(c)(3).
While unusually long and detailed on its face (compared with other rules),
rule 412 has no advisory committee note or other committee reports. Nor does
the new rule boast much in the way of judicial construction. One reason for this
latter dearth may be the rarity of rape cases in federal courts. For brief discussions
of rule 412, see 2 D. LomsEz.L & C. MuEL LR, FEDMRAL EVIMENCE §§ 197-199
(Supp. 1981); Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 44, at 551-53.
51 See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S.
129 (1968).
52 See supra text accompanying note 50.
The question remains, then, what infrequent and unusual "chain of events"
might raise the supervening constitutional right of inquiry into the otherwise pro-
hibited subject matter? I can only imagine cases where the victim had gratuitously
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C. Credibility Exceptions
If the primary behavioral issue at trial is the conduct of the
important actors during the past event in question, the secondary
issue is the behavior of the witnesses on the stand. This secondary
issue is usually called "credibility," though the issue might be more
properly termed "veracity"-not whether the testimony is believable
but whether it is true. Although I have put this question in second
place, I certainly do not disparage its importance. It is often the
only key to the mystery of the "primary" issue, and rightly receives
the most devoted attention of all concerned in the process. To
assist in the necessary resolution of this difficult trial issue, the law
of evidence allows another exception to the rule against reference
to character as a predictor of conduct: in specified instances char-
acter evidence is admissible to impeach a witness.5 3 Consistent with
the "pertinent trait" limitation applicable to character evidence
generally, evidence of character offered to enlighten the secondary
issue is restricted to the trait of truthfulness. 54 Apart from this
consistency, evidence of character pertaining to a testifying witness
has some distinctive features.
According to general practice and the federal rules as they
finally evolved, extrinsic evidence of general "truthfulness" may be
adduced by reputation or opinion concerning the character of any
witness who testifies.55 Here, however, unlike the case of character
evidence regarding some other "pertinent" trait, the evidence of
good repute cannot be introduced until character has been attacked,
either by evidence of bad reputation or opinion, "or otherwise"
(presumably by cross-examination suggesting untruthfulness). The
oddity here is that, despite major impediments to a rule of admit-
tance such as the avowed distrust of propensity evidence, the serious
danger of multiple byways to distract the factfinder's attention, and
the evident weakness of reputation evidence on a trait often in-
exactly termed "honesty and integrity," 56 the law generally and
asserted prior chastity or fidelity, or possibly ignorance of the physiology of sexual
contact As such, the proviso might have been better put in terms of relevant
rebuttal (which might otherwise count as an unwise omission from the reserved
allowances), but the clause need not otherwise detain us.
63 Fan. R. Evm. 608.
54Compare FED. R. Evm. 404(a)(1)-(2) with FED. R. Evm. 608(a) (similar
limitations on admissibility of character evidence).
55 See FED. B. Evm. 608(a); McCoaM cK, supra note 4, § 42.
56 For a discussion of the additional problems caused by our careless usage of
generalized character terms and the inherent narrowness of these categories, see
supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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perhaps universally tolerates it.5
The policy strong enough to overcome the obvious problems
with such evidence is doubtless the feeling that the hapless fact-
finder has little enough to go on in evaluating the veracity of a
stranger, usually testifying on an unfamiliar subject, in the strange
and artificial role of courtroom witness. Some sense of the wit-
ness's reputation for credibility among those who know him is a
necessary and reasonably fair guide. Compurgation may still have
its uses,58 and a good name still counts for something when other
indicia of credibility are indistinct. And avow it or not, we do
believe that the person thought by his peers to be honest in a
variety of unrelated ways is more likely than a person randomly
picked from the general run to behave in accordance with that
virtuous characteristic when he is seated on the stand and testifying
under oath. The converse appears even more sensible-a witness's
general reputation as a liar should be taken into account when
considering his veracity on a particular subject of importance.
This conclusion simply relies on the common belief that character
counts, despite the law's general refusal to acknowledge it openly.
The distinction between evidence of character bearing on a
witness's truthfulness and evidence of character generally has been
sharpened by the federal rules, at some cost in comprehension.
The draftsmen elected to transport the rules as applied to matters
of credibility from article 4 ("Relevancy and Its Limits") to article
6 ("Witnesses"). In doing so, the rules leave two somewhat dif-
ferent provisions applicable to character evidence as adduced for
or against a witness: rules 405 and 608.
While drafting cavils could occupy us for pages, one incon-
sistency resulting from the chosen form is serious. It concerns the
great variable factor in these equations: proof of specific conduct.
Rule 405(b), insofar as pertinent, allows that "proof may . . . be
made" of specific instances of conduct where character or a trait is
"an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense." Reading
this section alone, a lawyer might be forgiven for thinking that, if
he is defending on the theory that an adverse witness is fabricating
5 7 FED. R. Evm. 608(a); McComv4cK, supra note 4, §§ 44, 194; 3 W~msTn,
supra note 24, 11608103]; 3A WiGOE, supra note 2, §922, at 726 (Chadbourn
rev. 1970) ("Character for truth is always and everywhere admissible.").
Of course, additional considerations may underlie this rule. Bolstering credi-
bility when not disputed may waste precious time and may influence the factfinder
to decide on the basis of a party's "good and truthful" witnesses, regardless of
what they say. See FED. R. Evm. 608(a) advisory committee note; McComacK,
supra note 4, § 49, at 102 & n.73.
58 See supra notes 29-30 & accompanying text.
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his story out of vindictive and malicious bias, he may inquire, and
lacking satisfaction, offer extrinsic evidence to prove that the wit-
ness had previously brought an unfounded claim or charge against
the same defendant. 9 The phrase "essential element of a . . .
defense" must in some cases include a matter of veracity. Yet look-
ing at rule 608(b), it turns out that, on the question of credibility,
specific instances of the witness's prior conduct may not be proved
by extrinsic evidence, even if they are clearly probative of truthful-
ness or the lack of it.
Pursuing further the use of specific instances of prior conduct
as demonstrations of character (and thence as evidence of the con-
duct of the witness on the stand), we encounter one of the major
anomalies in the picture. Normally, and under the federal rules,6 0
extrinsic evidence will not be received concerning prior instances
of conduct by a witness, however well they may reveal the relevant
trait of truthfulness. 61 Diogenes himself would be removed from
the stand if he tried to recount the deed of a prior witness so
clearly bespeaking a love of truth that it convinced the old man to
put down his lantern at last. Even by cross-examination, the allow-
ance of prior acts bearing on credibility is limited.62  In the court's
discretion (Congress was careful to emphasize), 63 and only where
59 1 grant that FED. R. Evm. 405(b) does not say in so many words that
proof may be made by extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness's testimony that is
an essential element of a defense, but I think this is a plausible implication, par-
ticularly because subsection (a) mentions cross-examination explicitly when that is
the exclusive allowable time for the use of specific instances evidence. But see
FED. R. Evm. 405 advisory committee note (stating that specific instances "is not
generally permissible" for impeachment).
6 0 FED. R. Evm. 608(b).
61 Wigmore states that no bar to proof by extrinsic evidence existed prior to
the 1700's, but that after the early 1700's courts began prohibiting such evidence,
primarily because it confused the issues and surprised the opponent. 3A WiGMOIE,
supra note 2, § 979 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
McCormick, in accord with Wigmore, explains that the general requirement
that "the examiner must take his answer" means that the examiner may not call
other witnesses to prove the prior acts, though he may further cross-examine the
witness. McCoRuca, supra note 4, § 42; see also 3 WEiNsTEin, supra note 24,
f 608[05].
62 Note that specific instances of conduct are always admissible on cross-
examination, see FED. R. Evm. 404, 405(a), and sometimes admissible on direct,
see id. 405(b), to prove that a criminal defendant or a victim has acted in
accordance with specified traits.
63The second sentence of FED. R. Evm. 608(b) begins: "[Specific instances
of the conduct of a witness] may, however, in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination
of the witness .... ." The House committee amended the rule to emphasize the
discretionary power of the court in determining the scope of such testimony.
H.R. RE1,. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONC. &
AD. NEws 7075, 7084.
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the prior acts are truly probative of veracity, the witness may be
asked about his own prior dishonest conduct.4 Or, a witness attest-
ing to the good reputation of some other witness may be asked if
he had heard of, or considered certain dishonest behavior of, the
witness whose honesty he had just endorsed. This last exception
is a special case from our present perspective, because it does not
introduce prior conduct as proof of character to predict behavior
in accordance therewith, but rather serves to undermine the expert
status of the character witness by showing either that he had in-
sufficient data for his opinion, or that he had erroneously weighed
the data he had. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that, with
one limited exception, the rule regarding impeachment by prior
misconduct, like the rule regarding misconduct as proof of character
generally, appears-thus far-to be resolutely negative.
This stance of apparent refusal, however, rests upon ground
thoroughly undermined by a rule so devastating as to make a
mockery of the bar against specific instances of conduct. Too im-
portant and too vast to be called an exception, the rule I refer to
is the allowance of impeachment by proof of previous conviction.65
The rule has had an interesting career. Softened by case law in
the District of Columbia,66 it was hardened again by statute,67 only
64 Paragraph two of FED. R. Evm. 608(b) states: "The giving of testimony,
whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of
his privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which
relate only to credibility." The purpose of this provision, which the advisory com-
mittee felt was necessary from both constitutional and policy perspectives, is to
encourage witnesses to testify without fearing the disclosure of incriminating facts
irrelevant to the material facts of the case. 3 WEnsTEIN, supra note 24, ff 608[07];
see 8 WiGMoRE, supra note 2, §§ 2976-2277 (McNaughton rev. 1961); McCowmcK,
supra note 4, § 42. FED. R. Evm. 608(b) does not, of course, prohibit inquiry
into prior acts for purposes other than credibility. Under FED. R. Evm. 404(b),
for example, evidence inadmissible on the issue of credibility would be admissible
to show proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident. See infra text accompanying notes 110-13.
65 See FFD. R. Evm. 609. See generally Cohen, Impeachment of a Defendant-
Witness by Prior Conviction, 6 Cawm. L. BuLL. 26 (1970); Click, Impeachment by
Prior Convictions: A Critique of Rule 6-09 of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for
U.S. District Courts, 6 Cmnm. L. BuLL. 330 (1970); McGowan, Impeachment of
Criminal Defendants by Prior Convictions, 2 LAw & Soc. Oenn. 1 (1970); Spector,
Impeaching the Defendant by His Prior Convictions and the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and Three Steps Backward, 1 Loy. U.
Cmr. L.J. 247 (1970); Impeachment Under Rule 609(a): Suggestions for Confining
and Guiding Trial Court Discretion, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 655 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Symposium]; Note, supra note 27.
06The oft-cited case of Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
stressed that the introduction of prior convictions for impeachment was an area for
the exercise of judicial discretion. The Luck court suggested relevant factors in
the determination: the nature of the prior crimes, the length of the criminal record,
the age and circumstances of the defendant, and the extent to which it is more
important to the search for truth in a particular case for the jury to hear the
defendant's story than to know the prior conviction. Id. 769.
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to develop a variety of modifications in various state jurisdictions
(by judicial and legislative efforts),6 8 and then to receive a careful
restyling in federal rule 609. In all shapes and forms, the rule
remains capricious at best, more likely pernicious in the criminal
process, and probably equally injurious to justice when applied on
the civil side. A major task of this Article will be to argue that
the rules of evidence governing the admissibility of character-
bespeaking conduct generally, and convictions in particular, are just
the reverse of what logic and good sense would commend.
How did we come by this legal axiom allowing severe credi-
bility impeachment by the unadorned fact of a prior conviction
against the general scorn for evidence of prior misconduct? Per-
haps the simplest answer is the purely mechanical one: unlike prior
misconduct generally, prior criminal conviction may be easily proved
extrinsically from public records. 69 Three strikes, however, may
be pitched against this appealing theory. First, we do not normally
compose rules-nor should we-in the delicate balance of pertinence
and digression solely on the crude basis of documentary availability.
In many cases, trial issues may be as readily confused, time as easily
wasted, and net gain as uncertain by the introduction of a pur-
ported official computer printout "record" as by a witness's descrip-
tion of other specific bad acts. Moreover, a witness challenged by
his conviction may well try to introduce evidence to contradict or
amplify the record, thereby destroying any claim of neatness of
proof. Second, although the designation "official record" may over-
come hearsay objections to its admission,"° it is no guarantee of
A few years later, in Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968), Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger elaborated
on Luck, creating a more extensive list of factors: the nature of the past crimes,
the time of conviction and the witness's subsequent history, the similarity between
the past crime and the crime charged (crimes with great similarity to the one
charged should be sparingly admitted because of the impermissible propensity
inference), the importance of the defendant's testimony, and the certainty of the
credibility issue. Id. 940.
17 In 1970, Congress reacted to Luck and Gordon by amending § 14-305 of
the District of Columbia Code, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970), to remove
discretion from the judge and to allow the unchallenged introduction of felonies,
without regard to the nature of the offense, and crimen falsi, without regard to the
grade of the offense. See Fm). R. Evm. 609 advisory committee note. The statute
was upheld in Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89 (D.C.), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
926 (1972).
68 See generally McCorMNck, supra note 4, § 43.
49 The federal rules explicitly allow evidence of certain prior convictions to
attack credibility, but only if elicited from the witness or extrinsically "established
by public record."
7oFED. R. Ewm. 803(8).
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accuracy, as every practitioner in the criminal courts knows. Fur-
ther, the very fact that it is called "official" unduly underwrites its
supposed validity. Third, what the record actually says-even if
clear, complete, and accurate-is often of very little value concern-
ing the criminal conduct supposedly relevant to the credibility of
the witness. What can a conscientious lay factfinder learn from a
sheet that says a person was arrested and charged with assault and
robbery and convicted of the attempted possession of a weapon?
Or, if the charge at arrest is "redacted," does the record speak to
credibility when it informs the jury that a witness was convicted
of unlawful possession of stolen property in the second degree?
And these are examples that at least boast crimes with generally
understood names.
71
Because the efficiency argument can hardly be a completely
satisfying explanation, we might next try to derive the rule's pur-
pose from its development. Witnesses, in the modern sense, were
invented during the sixteenth century,7 2 but it is only in the last
hundred years that persons previously convicted have been per-
mitted to testify under oath.73 As with a number of other conclu-
sive presumptions of incredibility, 74 evolution was (and continues
to be) from rejection to relevancy.7 5 The distrust of the witness,
which barred testimony for three centuries or more, continues to
govern the rule, but rather than spelling incompetence, it now
produces a mere presumption of relevance to veracity.7 6 Thus,
today we have advanced to the point where we can say to the
previously convicted witness: you may testify but the jury charged
with evaluating your honesty may, and doubtless will, consider
7 1 One can imagine the lack of enlightenment from a record showing previous
convictions for "RICO," "Conspiracy," and "Travel Act"
72 See 9 W. HoLnswonTH, A issroay oF ENGLISH LAV 178 (3d ed. 1944).
73 See McCoRMzcx, supra note 4, § 64; Ladd, supra note 11, at 174-75. The
common law disqualification was finally revoked in federal courts in 1917. Rosen
v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1917).
74 McCormick describes a number of them: immaturity, mental incapacity, lack
of belief in a retributive divine being, and being a party, other interested person,
or spouse of the same. McCoiacK, supra note 4, §§ 62-63, 65-66.
75 Some disqualifications, notably the "dead man's statute," are still being
reformed. In this instance, however, the usual evolutionary pattern has been ignored
by codemakers who simply abolish the old refusal to hear the survivor's version
of the transaction with the deceased. See id. § 65.
7
6 See Gnxx r N, supra note 8, § 372, at 513 ("The basis of the rule seems
to be that such a person is morally too corrupt to be trusted to testify; so reckless
of the distinction between truth and falsehood and insensible to the restraining
force of an oath, as to render it extremely improbable that he will speak the truth
at all."); see also WEIsmTmn, supra note 24, IJ 609[021; 2 WiGoMRE, supra note 2,
§ 519 (3d ed. 1940) (suggesting that disqualification was part of the punishment
for the crime).
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your criminal history because people like you who have been con-
victed of serious crimes are (now as of yore) more likely than the
rest of mankind to lie under oath about whatever you are asked.
As the descendant of absolute disqualification, the modern
predictor of mendacity may be one of those inherited artifacts that
masquerade as the product of a contemporary and rational analysis
of common experience. Legal social science-a pot of maxims,
adages, and homilies about the regular behavior of average human
beings-is a vital sub-dogma of jurisprudence.77 Its prized empirical
tools are hunch, conjecture, and surmise; or, as its many experts
prefer to put it: "common sense," "ordinary experience," and
"standing to reason."
Thus, if you happen to ask a judge, or some other legal social
scientist, why he or she thinks that the jury ought to hear about
the defendant's record of four shoplifting convictions and one
armed robbery in this trial for arson-assuming, of course, that the
said defendant is so ill-advised as to choose to testify-the likely
reply will be that it stands to reason that a person of that back-
ground does not deserve the same credence as one without it.78 If
you press a little, you will be informed that common sense and
ordinary intelligence confirm that a person who has demonstrated
his contempt for social constraints will be less reluctant to lie
under oath to save his hide.79 Patiently, your informant will stress
that shoplifting is a crime of stealth and deception warranting the
77 See, e.g., Glick, supra note 65, at 331-34.
78 For example, Congressman Hogan, in debating rule 609, asserted:
Mr. Chairman, no one can object to permitting a witness to be held
up to a jury as unworthy of belief because he or she had been convicted
for cheating or stealing, but that surely does not exhaust the subject
matter. How credible is a witness who has been convicted, let us say, for
kidnapping, or for espionage, or for inciting civil disorders, or for aircraft
piracy, or for assassination, or for any of a number of other crimes set out
in title 18 of the United States Code? Does it make sense to allow a
conviction for theft to be proved against a witness and not allow other
felony convictions to be proved? Are we really that suspect of acts of
dishonesty while willing to keep from the juries the information, for
example, that a witness had been convicted for making explosive or incen-
diary devices with the intent to detonate them in public buildings. Per-
sonally I am more concerned about the moral worth of individuals capable
of engaging in such outrageous acts as adversely reflecting on a witness'
character than I am of thieves, and that comparison justifies my amend-
ment.
120 CONG. REEC. 2376 (1974) (remarks of Representative Hogan).
70 In discussing the disqualification of felons from testifying, Bentham explained:
"In any other case, the argument for the exclusion is no more than this: He has
violated the obligations of morality in some sorts of ways; therefore it is more or
less probable that he will, upon occasion, violate them in this sort of way [lying).
7 J. BE-NTHAM, RA-nONALE OF JUDmcL EvImENcE 406 (Bowring ed. 1827), quoted
in 2 WGMopE, supra note 2, § 519, at 727 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
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belief that as a witness, the perpetrator of this crime would not
scruple to lie, while robbery is a serious enough offense to signify
that the defendant is the sort of person who puts his own interests
above those of the society.80 The same confident knowledge of
human behavior demands that the credibility of a bystander de-
scribing an automobile collision be evaluated with the datum that
three years before he pleaded guilty to assault with a dangerous
weapon.
Despite their currency, it might be convincingly argued that
these sturdy propositions do not in fact stand to reason nor accord
with ordinary intelligence and common experience. Most people
lie occasionally. They lie on important matters and under oath in
direct proportion to their interests "I and inverse proportion to
their belief that the truth can be objectively demonstrated. In
this formula, the fact that a person has been convicted of a crime,
any crime, deserves miniscule importance. At the same time, the
evidence of prior conviction has enormous impact, tempting a fact-
finder to reject the felon's story without careful scrutiny.82 Further-
more, speaking only of criminal defendants as witnesses (where the
crunch is), it seems quite likely that a guilty person without prior
convictions will lie on the stand as readily as will a guilty veteran,
80 The New York Court of Appeals followed this reasoning in People v. Sando-
val, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 377, 314 N.E.2d 413, 417-18, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 855 (1974):
To the extent, however, that the prior commission of a particular crime of
calculated violence or of specified vicious or immoral acts significantly
revealed a willingness or disposition on the part of the particular defendant
voluntarily to place the advancement of his individual self-interest ahead
of principle or of the interests of society, proof thereof may be relevant to
suggest his readiness to do so again on the witness stand. A demonstrated
determination deliberately to further self-interest at the expense of society
or in derogation of the interests of others goes to the heart of honesty
and integrity.
81 Arguing that a witness is qualified to testify despite past criminal offenses as
long as evidence of these crimes is admissible for impeachment, Bentham states:
[Dlishonesty leads the witness to lie only by the medium of some interest.
Even the least upright of men, when he is not under the influence of some
seducing interest, and is surrounded by the restraints of the law, and ex-
posed to the shame and punishment of false testimony, will not be so
much his own enemy, as to commit a dangerous crime without any view
of profit.
Examine, likewise, whether his offence has been of such a nature as
to affect his credibility in the case at issue. He may formerly have given
false evidence, but it was in defence of himself, or of some one who was
dear to him. Does it follow, that, where he has no interest, he will
commit the same crime to endanger the life of a stranger?
J. BENTHA , A TxArssE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 250-51 (M. Dumont trans. 1825).
82 See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 65, at 665 (assuming high prejudicial
impact of any past crime); Note, supra note 27, at 773-74 (discussing the degree
of prejudice depending on the nature of other crimes evidence).
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while innocent people with extensive criminal histories will testify
as truthfully as the innocent novice. If that view is correct, the
impeachment rubric is a hoax, merely a cover for the admission of
evidence bearing on propensity-which is what the rule's defenders
are probably seeking.
Smuggling propensity evidence into a criminal prosecution
must be taken as a fairly serious offense to some cherished notions
of fairness.8 3 However much common sense and ordinary intelli-
gence may insist that evidence of criminal propensity is relevant,
powerful considerations of policy preclude the use of prior convic-
tions on the issue of guilt. On a theoretical level, we base our
criminal justice on the precept that a person will be convicted only
for what he does, not who he is or what he has done prior to the
event in question. On a practical level, we will not run the risk of
convicting the innocent that a propensity theorem entails. Accord-
ingly, though the proof of prior conviction may be accepted, the
jury will be repeatedly and forcefully cautioned that they are not
to take the fact that the defendant has been previously convicted
as any evidence whatever that he committed the crime with which
he is now charged. s  If any juror paused to consider this standard
instruction (and there is no report that any juror has), he or she
would find it odd indeed: the jurors are told that they may not
judge the defendant guilty of arson because he committed that
robbery and those other larcenies, but they may consider those
83 See, e.g., Ladd, supra note 11, at 176-78 (evidence of single crime unreliable
predictor of credibility or character generally); Weissenberger, Character Evidence
under the Federal Rules: A Puzzle with Missing Pieces, 48 U. GN. L. REv. 1
(1979) (assuming propensity inferences are invalid); Note, supra note 27, at 763-64.
But cf. McGowan, supra note 65, at 8-9 & nn.32-33 (questioning assumption that
propensity inference is invalid and comparing continental experience).
84 For example, pattern jury instructions for criminal cases in the Fifth Circuit
read as follows:
The fact that a witness has previously been convicted of a felony, or
a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, is also a factor you may
consider in weighing the credibility of that witness. The fact of such a
conviction does not necessarily destroy the witness' credibility, but is one
of the circumstances you may take into account in determining the weight
to be given to his testimony.
As stated before, a Defendant has a right not to testify. If a Defend-
ant does testify, however, his testimony should be weighed and considered,
and his credibility determined, in the same way as that of any other wit-
ness. Evidence of a Defendant's previous conviction of a crime is to be
considered by you only insofar as it may affect the credibility of the
Defendant as a witness, and must never be considered as evidence of
guilt of the crime for which the Defendant is on trial.
Comnurr oN PA-rEnN Juay INsTRucTizos, DisTracT JuDGEs AssocrATuoN, FwnrH
Cmcurr, PATTEn- JuRY INsTurcTI Os (Cnmnw.A CAsEs) 17 (1979).
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convictions in deciding whether the defendant lied when he denied
committing the arson.
Apart from the illusory distinction at its core, enunciation of
the rule does more to satisfy legal scholasticism than to direct the
minds of real jurors. Although jurors seem to digest knotty prin-
ciples, no one can believe in actual compliance with instructions
of this sort. At least in a criminal case when the previously con-
victed witness is the defendant himself, the pretense seems cruel.
Jurors cannot close one eye to the important news that the person
on trial has a record of prior convictions. No one in court believes
that the jury will consider this evidence only as affecting credence,
particularly if the crime on trial is similar to the prior offenses.s5
At the very least, the information about the defendant's back-
ground reduces the care with which the jury sifts the evidence, as
they might regret a false positive less than they would with a
"clean" defendant. Yet, the impossible task required of jury in-
structions, coupled with the grave potential of prejudice, did not
escape the notice of reformers.
When the Supreme Court sent Congress a version of the rule
that copied the prevailing law of the District of Columbia, the
House Judiciary Committee ground it down to the hard, narrow,
and clean (and radical) proposal that for ordinary witnesses and for
a defendant as his own witness, impeachment could be by prior
conviction only if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement.8 6
This idea was modified in the Senate Judiciary Committee, 7 which
split defendant-witnesses-who faced the greatest danger of spillover
prejudice-from other witnesses, only to have the conference com-
mittee recombine the two categories.88 As passed, federal rule 609
provides that during cross-examination of any witness, it may be
established that he was previously convicted of (1) a felony, if the
85 A student survey revealed that 98% of the criminal attorneys and 43% of the
trial judges questioned believed that juries were unable to follow an instruction to
consider prior convictions evidence for the purpose of evaluating the defendant's
credibility rather than as evidence of his guilt. To Take the Stand or Not To Take
the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Criminal Record, 4 COLUJM.
J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 215, 218 (1968); see also Note, The Limiting Instruction-
Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 Mnm. L. Bv. 264, 281-88 (1966); Note, supra
note 27, at 777 & n.89 .
86 H.R. EP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7084 ("In full committee, the provision was amended to
permit attack upon the credibility of a witness by prior conviction only if the prior
conviction involved dishonesty or false statement.").
87 S. RE. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE Co,G. & Ai. NEws 7051, 7061.
88H.R. BiF,. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CoNG. & Ax. NEws 7098, 7102-03.
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court determines that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the defendant, or (2) any crime that "involved dishonesty
or false statement." 19 This evolved form unfortunately loses the
welcome rationality of the House stroke, regaining only the old
amalgam of dubious theory and doubtful application that preceded
codification.
Take in reverse order the two uses of prior convictions allow-
able by rule 609. It might at first appear that here, at least, is a
moment of good thinking: a limitation of impeaching prior con-
victions to those involving dishonesty or false statement and there-
fore having a clear relation to the issue of testimonial veracity.
But let us be so bold as to be naive: just what is a crime involv-
ing "dishonesty"? Because the terms are coupled in the alternative,
it is evidently something other than a crime that involves "false
statement." Even that latter term is not altogether self-defining.
Once you pass the obvious examples in which a false declaration
is an element of the crime, such as perjury, larceny by fraud, or
filing false documents of various sorts, the question becomes de-
batable. Does the phrase contemplate crimes in which false repre-
sentation is implicit or perhaps relevant to intent, such as the un-
lawful practice of medicine; does it refer to the instrumental use
of deception in the particular instance, such as a rape committed
by a man posing as a gas company inspector? Leaving astern these
difficulties with the ingredient "false statement," let us explore the
quality of "dishonesty" generally as a means of distinguishing one
category of crime from all others for this very important purpose.
Could not an excellent case be made for the thesis that all
crimes, or virtually all, involve "dishonesty"? 90 The word once
89 Of the five-part rule 609, the general proposition is put as follows:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or
established by public record during cross-examination but only if the
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
FED. R. Evin. 609(a). Paragraph (b) rules out convictions over ten years old
unless the court finds them highly probative and advance notice is tendered to the
adverse party. Other parts deal with juvenile adjudications, the effect of pardon,
etc., and the pendency of appeal.
90 The congressional debate concerning rule 609 contains a discussion of the
differences between dishonesty and false statement and whether all crimes involve
dishonesty. 120 CONG. REc. 2376-81 (1976). The speakers reach different con-
clusions, leaving no clear guideline. See, e.g., id. (statements of Representatives
Wiggins, Danielson, and Brasco); see also Ladd, supra note 11, at 178-80 (some
crimes have no probative value on the issue of the credibility of the offender).
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meant "dishonorable," and at least one current meaning of the
word "honesty" is "uprightness." 91 It is often coupled (in court,
at least) with the word "integrity" which, in the sense intended,
means of sound and sincere moral principle. Is there any common
law crime that does not, then, in some sense, "involve" conduct
fairly called dishonest? As one wag put it: you have to go to law
school to find out that while forgery is dishonest, burglary is not.
Separating "honest" from "dishonest" criminal conduct is a
task to delight a scholastic monk. The law has long relied on
verbal tags to express a supposed qualitative difference between
significant moral vacuity and ordinary criminal badness. A familiar,
if a bit quaint term is "moral turpidtude." 92 As Black's Law
Dictionary defines that term, it appears to be a definition of crime
enhanced by some rhetorical pejoratives.93 In usage, the phrase
serves better as invective than as the heading for a discrete cata-
logue of offenses. The Senate Judiciary Committee today prefers
"crimen falsi" to describe the relevant category of criminal of-
fenses.9 4 Indeed, the much quoted passage in the Senate commit-
tee's report, defining this entire phrase, is a model of the lawyer's
worst style of definition: rotund, synonymic, inclusive, circular,
and incorporating the word being defined. It leaves the mind
comforted but unnourished. Here it is (describing, remember,
crimes relevant to testimonial veracity):
91 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) includes in its definitions of honesty:
"Uprightness of disposition and conduct; integrity, truthfulness, straightforwardness:
the quality opposed to lying, cheating, or stealing." The OED concludes that this
definition is "[t]he prevailing modem sense." V THE OxFoir ENGLISH DIcTIONAnY
363 (rev. 1961).
92 As the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors stated many years ago:
Logically the quality and not the penalty of the crime should fix its
classification, and crimes whose commission involves an inherent baseness,
and which are in conflict with those moral attributes upon which the
relations of life are based, are infamous. They are said to be those which
involve moral turpitude. In itself this is a vague term, lacking precision.
Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 506, 111 A. 861, 863 (1920).
The term still appears in the immigration context, as 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)
(1976) makes "aliens who have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpi-
tude" ineligible to receive visas and excludable from the United States. The pages
of annotations attest to the difficulty that courts experience in determining the
exact meaning of moral turpitude in this context as well. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1182(a)(9) (1970 & Supp. 1981) (notes 139-54); see also United States ex rel.
De George v. Jordan, 183 F.2d 768, 769 (7th Cir. 1950) ("We find many defini-
tions of moral turpitude."), re'd, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (moral turpitude standard
not unconstitutionally vague).
9 3 B_Aca's LAw DICTIONARY 910 (rev. 5th ed. 1979); see also McComaccC,
supra note 4, § 43, at 85-86 & n.57; Ladd, supra note 11, at 181-83.
94 See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
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By that phrase [offenses involving false statement or dis-
honesty], the committee means crimes such as perjury, or
subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud,
embezzlement or false pretense, or any other offense, in
the nature of crimen falsi the commission of which in-
volves some element of untruthfulness, deceit or falsifica-
tion bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truth-
fully.95
By the dull gleam of this legislative prose, a diligent judge
could not discern the nature of a prior misdemeanor conviction for
fortune-telling, bribery, or shoplifting. Moreover, the final clause
of the explanative report, describing this group of provable prior
convictions as "bearing on" veracity seems to put the enumerated
"crimen falsi" right back into the first part of rule 609(a), felonies
relevant to propensity to lie under oath.
To recognize the true shape of the provision, then, we must
examine the first category of prior crime evidence allowable for
impeachment-felonies having probative value on the issue of credi-
bility. With some limitations and exemptions that need not con-
cern us, the federal rule provides that a defendant, or any other
witness, may be confronted, by examination or by evidence, with a
prior felony conviction if the judge believes that the jury will be
assisted in the determination of credibility more than the defendant
will be otherwise harmed by a false jury inference. 9 That is as
plainly as the probity-prejudice standard can be put in this context.
It approximates the rules adopted and evolved in a number of
jurisdictions which have tried to compromise between the appetite
of the factfinder for clues to the resolution of the imponderables
of credibility and the potential prejudice to the defendant of a bad
criminal record.97
Right at the start, we probably should admit that the rather
odd wording of rule 609(a)(1) might simply be an indirect way of
providing that, while the victim or any other witness may be im-
peached by any prior felony conviction, the defendant need worry
95 S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CoN. & AD. NEWs 7051, 7061.
9 6 FED. R. EviD. 609(a)(1).
97 See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 947 (1969); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968); Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763
(D.C. Cir. 1965); People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971).
But see, e.g., Commonwealth v. West, 357 Mass. 245, 258 N.E.2d 22 (1970);
State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130, 228 A.2d 682 (1967), overruled, 76 N.J. 127,
147, 386 A.2d 378, 388 (1978).
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only about those falling within the rather uncertain bounds of the
"dishonesty" category: rule 609(a)(2). After all, prejudice "to the
defendant" registers nil when he trots out the eyewitness's previous
record for, let us say, sodomy.98 And some inferences concerning
the witness's veracity can be drawn from virtually any criminal
activity.9 9 On the other hand, the relevance to credibility is never
so great that it overcomes the danger of a forbidden propensity
inference when the defendant is the witness. 00 If this be so, the
federal rules have slipped into the law an invidious discrimina-
tion which might well affect unjustly the result in a criminal trial.1' 1
Consider a case, not too farfetched, where bcth the defendant and
the government's principal witness have felony records, perhaps for
drug-related crimes. Both testify. The jury hears that the govern-
ment witness has been previously convicted for serious crimes, but,
so far as they know, the defendant has a clean past. Who would
blame them for finding a reasonable doubt on that basis alone
(amplified, of course, by the "skillful" summation by defense
counsel)? Moreover, the rule undercuts its own rationale of rele-
vance if it permits a defendant to testify shorn of his criminal past
while a witness against him takes the stand with his credibility
encumbered by his unredacted history.
981 am less clear as to the application of the "prejudice to the defendant"
test when the witness with the record is called by the defense. Does the defendant
face a cognizable hazard that the jury might convict him because of his witness's
unsavory background? It seems to me at least arguable that prejudice by associa-
tion may protect defense witnesses from disclosure of prior convictions, particularly
if the circumstances are such that the jury may find the witness and the defendant
closely associated in the alleged criminal enterprise.
99 See supra notes 90-91 & accompanying text.
100 See McConMscr, supra note 4, § 43, at 89-90 & n.87 (describing prejudice
to the defendant when his testimony is impeached by evidence of prior convictions).
101 "Smuggled" may be an inappropriate verb to describe a deliberate choice
of the legislature. It may well have been a desired consequence that the probity-
prejudice meter always favors the defense. Thus, for example, in United States v.
Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (emphasis in original), Judge McGowan
asserts that the phrase "to the defendant" in rule 609(a)(1) "reflects a deliberate
choice to regulate impeachment by prior conviction only where the defendant's
interests might be damaged by admission of evidence of past crimes, and not
where the prosecution might suffer, or where a non-defendant witness complains
of possible loss of reputation in the community." In a footnote, Judge McGowan
finds support for this conclusion in the legislative history. Id. n.21.
"Smuggle" may also be a poor choice of language for a rule so clear and
apparent to observers as to be practically patent. A leading treatise, for example,
states it clearly: 'That is, Rule 609(a)(1) .. . does not authorize a court to
disallow defense efforts to impeach prosecution witnesses." 3 D. LouIsEr &
C. MuEILER, supra note 50, § 316, at 324-25 (1979). A string of federal decisions
to the same effect is supplied.
Yet it seems to me the drafter of the rule was less than forthcoming in
framing a rule with such blatantly one-sided effects. If a rule admitting prior
felony convictions against all witnesses except the defendant was intended, it
might have been worded to state so openly.
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Beyond the jolt to sense and symmetry, consider the plight of
the trial judge, enjoined to make fine distinctions, on a case-by-case
basis, at least as to defendants contemplating a trip to the stand.
10 2
How is the wisest and most meticulous judge to make an intelligent
discrimination between prior convictions using a probity-prejudice
test? Compared to this exercise of judicial choice, decisions on bail
and sentence are models of scientific precision. Imagine the process
by which a judge will determine, for example, that a defendant
previously convicted of robbing a grocery store will not scruple to
lie on the stand when defending against a charge of assaulting a
woman in the park with a knife, compared to a man charged with
the same offense who has never before been convicted? And having
decided whether the prior convictions are relevant, the judge still
must consider the prejudicial impact of this evidence. Can the
judge rationally determine if the probative value of the robbery
conviction for credibility is outweighed by the danger that the jury
might believe, despite contrary instructions, that the prior convic-
tion proves that the defendant was disposed to commit violent
crimes and hence convict for the assault based in significant part
on the impermissible inference of proclivity?
Undeniably, judges have been regularly making just such de-
cisions..0 3  But it is quite possible that they have not been making
them on the basis professed. In all but the simplest cases, it is
doubtful whether those crime-weary, litigation-worn, well-meaning
102 Even though all felony convictions always may be adduced against prose-
cution witnesses, the rule appears to allow some prior convictions to be used to
impeach the defendant as a witness. It is here, then, that the rule requires
judicial deliberation. FED. R. EvM. 609(a)(1).
103 According to Weinstein and Berger, courts generally conclude that crimes
involving fraud may be used to impeach. WEINsTFN, supra note 24, ff 609[041, at
609-71. See United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1980) (mail fraud),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 985 (1980); United States v. Apuzzo, 555 F.2d 306 (2d
Cir. 1977) (possession and transportation of untaxed cigarettes-defrauding the
revenue), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 916 (1978); United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d
1315 (9th Cir. 1976) (conspiracy to issue unauthorized securities and mail fraud),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111 (1977).
Crimes involving force usually are not admitted for impeachment purposes.
See United States v. Lossiab, 537 F.2d 1250 (4th Cir. 1976) (disorderly conduct);
Carisen v. javurek, 526 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1975) (assault and battery); WFqSTmN,
supra note 24, ff 609[04], at 609-72.
Courts differ on the admissibility of evidence of crimes involving taking of
property. Compare United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976) and
United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977)
(robbery is not dishonesty with United States v. Wilson, 536 F.2d 883 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976); United States v. Bianco, 419 F. Supp. 507
(E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd mei., 547 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1977) (robbery involves
dishonesty) and United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir.) (petit larceny
involves dishonesty), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976).
Courts also vary in their determination of the admissibility of narcotics con-
victions. See WEmNsTm, supra note 24, 1f 609[041.
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people believe the illusion they appear to promote: that the con-
victions allowed to impeach a defendant-witness have greater bear-
ing on credibility than on propensity to commit the crime charged.
What actually may be going on in courtrooms where judges regu-
larly make these determinations is this: the judge is deciding the
appropriate tax to levy on the history-laden defendant's choice to
testify. In the interests of fairness (and incidentally the constitu-
tional policy not to burden unduly the exercise of the right to give
evidence), 104 the defendant will be relieved of some of the poison
of his past. But perhaps not all of it. The judge may feel that a
proven criminal should not be allowed to swear to what he will in
the white cloak of a blameless citizen; that would be abusing the
privilege. And so the judge, by silent processes that are undoubt-
edly unclear to himself, picks from among the convictions those
that are serious enough to be "relevant," without being so serious
or so similar to the case on trial as to be "prejudicial," and then
simply concludes that the jury "ought" to hear of them if the de-
fendant elects to testify.
Direct or perverse, the selective use of prior convictions to
impeach credibility amounts to the proof of past instances of mis-
conduct from which to infer (testimonial) behavior consistent there-
with-i.e., dishonesty. There is no blinking the anomaly: rule 609
allows what rule 608 prohibits. 05 The fact that the prior misdeed
is evinced by a recorded conviction may facilitate and strengthen
the proof of it; it cannot improve its relevance. And admitting
these propensity-indicative prior misdeeds in the form of prior con-
victions may compound the prejudice. The convictions stamp the
deed with official status, carrying both the mark of proven fact and
the suggestion of continuing dangerousness. Nor is this heightened
onus balanced by enhanced probity, for the bare fact of conviction
of a named offense does not inform the jury of the surrounding or
constituent acts and circumstances from which some notions of
relevant character might be discerned. 100
There are, moreover, a number of pressing matters large and
small which these provisions of the federal rules leave unattended.
3
0 4 See FED. R. EviD. 608(b) advisory committee note.
105Rule 608(b) does not conceal the conflict. It provides that: "Specific
instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting
his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be
proved by extrinsic evidence." Fm-. R. Evm. 608(b) (emphasis added). The
advisory committee laconically comments that the clause simply "recognized" the
exception to the general rule for the case of prior conviction. Id. advisory com-
mittee note.
1 0B See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
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For example, while pardoned offenses in specified instances are
unavailable for impeachment, and the pendency of an appeal is
admissible but otherwise insignificant, the rules give no further
hint concerning the admissibility of reversed convictions, most of
which may have been upset for reasons other than the innocence
of the defendant.10 7 Too, the rule offers no suggestion concerning
the admissibility of facts underlying the fact of conviction, either
to enhance the probative value on credibility or, from the person
impeached, to reduce it. While the advisory committee note to the
preceding rule, 608, indicates an intention to reject a famous thirty-
year-old case in New York, People v. Sorge,108 the note does not
appear to disapprove of allowing examination beyond the bare fact
of prior conviction for a named offense '09-the proposition for
which this New York decision is most often cited.
But larger, perhaps, than these gaps in the rule is its failure to
afford clear guidance in the solution of the big question in the area
of selective admission of prior convictions for the impeachment of a
testifying defendant: should the court allow for impeachment a re-
cent conviction for a serious offense "involving" conduct probative
of credibility (according to the judge's best belief), but notably
similar to the primary conduct in issue? Concretely, when a de-
fendant testifies in defense of a charge of embezzlement of nego-
tiable securities in Arizona, may the government impeach by a
107 One commentator notes: "Of course nothing in Rule 609(e) authorizes the
use for impeachment purposes of a conviction which has already been reversed
or otherwise set aside, even though such a conviction might be admissible for
other purposes." 3 D. LOuSFLL & C. MuELLER, supra note 50, § 323, at 376.
But it might as easily be said that nothing in the rule prohibits the use of the
prior conviction merely because it was subsequently reversed or otherwise set aside.
108 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950).
109 Sorge is cited for a variety of related propositions. At its broadest, Sorge
supports judicial discretion as to the scope and range of cross-examination. People
v. Duncan, 46 N.Y.2d 74, 385 N.E.2d 572, 412 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 910 (1979); People v. Duffy, 36 N.Y.2d 258, 326 N.E.2d 804, 367
N.Y.S.2d 236 (1975). Courts also cite Sorge as authority for the proposition that
the questioner is not bound by the initial answer and may continue the line of
questioning in an attempt to bring out a different answer. People v. Wise, 46
N.Y.2d 321, 385 N.E.2d 1262, 413 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1978). Additionally, Sorge has
been cited to support the proposition that inquiry is permitted into all immoral,
criminal, or vicious acts. People v. Carmack, 44 N.Y.2d 706, 376 N.E.2d 919,
405 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1978) (Cooke, J., dissenting); People v. Piranian, 77 Misc. 2d
441, 354 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1974); People v. Sandova], 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d
413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974) (restricting Sorge in this respect). In commenting
on rule 608(b), the advisory committee rejected the doctrine of Sorge and con-
demned the last of these uses as a violation of the constitutional protection against
self-incrimination. Fo. R. Evm. 608(b) advisory committee note. Most com-
monly, however, Sorge is cited for the proposition that the impeaching questioner
is not restricted to the fact of conviction and the name of the crime for which the
witness was convicted, but may probe somewhat further into illuminating aspects
of the offense.
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prior conviction for a similar crime five years before in Maryland?
Here, where judges grope and practice sways, the support of a rule
if not a rationale would be most welcome. If the rule 609 theorem
was any warrant, one might expect an answer, at least by implica-
tion, to this troublesome problem.
D. The "Special Purpose" Exception ("KIPPOMIA")
Of the several exceptions to the rule against the proof of char-
acteristic prior conduct to establish the occurrence of the primary
conduct in issue, the most curious is the one to which we now turn.
It is an exception without a respectable name, a mongrel of diverse
strains joined, it seems, by no more serious principle than happen-
stance. Indeed, its enumerated special purposes appear so arbi-
trarily collected in the rule that it is one of the few doctrines for
which generations of law students have had to invent an mnemonic
device to recall its elusive parts to mind. Let us look at it in the
form given it by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Evidence of
"other crimes, wrongs, or acts," while inadmissible to show char-
acter in order to prove conduct consistent therewith, is nonetheless
allowed by rule 404(b) for "other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab-
sence of mistake or accident." 110 (My acronym is "KIPPOMIA.")
Need we pause to puzzle over the meaning of these eight or
nine items on this particular list? Should we furrow our brow over
the difference between plan and preparation or between knowledge
and the absence of mistake or accident? Must we scratch for ex-
amples of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" that might prove an
opportunity to perform the act in issue? Fortunately, we probably
can omit this exercise. We need not here explore the application
of each of these exceptional purposes, nor attempt to refine their
definitions. The entire list, obviously, arrived-complete-down
the chute of history. A virtually identical version can be found
in a famous decision of the New York Court of Appeals written in
the second year of this century,"' and several earlier treatises recite
a comparable catalogue." 2 The origins are doubtless obscure in
the mists antedating the great treatises.
110 FED. R. Evm. 404(b). See generally Kuhns, supra note 13.
"'People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 293, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (1901) (motive,
intent, absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan embracing the
commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends
to establish the others, the identity of the person charged with the commission of
the crime on trial).
112 The Molineux court cited as authorities for the exceptions F. WHAITON,
CImRuAL EvmENcE § 48 (9th ed. 1885); H. UNDEmILL, A TnEnsE ON Tmm LAW
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It is enough to note that, whatever each of the KIPPOMIA
items means singly, and whatever the seductive "such as" preceding
the list may add to it, the aggregate describes a remarkably broad
compass. Taken as a whole, the rule permits proof of prior mis-
deeds to show the identity of the actor, his critical state of mind,
and many of the preceding and attendant circumstances of the act
in issue. In criminal prosecutions at least (where the rule is most
often applied), these three aspects are the common and central
components of the ordinary case.
This is not to say, however, that virtually all evidence of prior
misconduct is readily admissible. The proffered proof not only
must be tagged with one of the enumerated KIPPOMIA purposes,
it must be relevant to that issue in the evidentiary sense. The test
of ordinary relevance is often an insuperable barrier. Thus, even
if it could be argued that a defendant's rape of a woman in 1974
was offered to show that the defendant intended to commit the
crime of rape when he allegedly broke into another woman's apart-
ment in 1981, the inferential link is so weak (particularly when
weighed against prejudice) that the proof would be excluded on
basic relevance grounds. Moreover, only if the proof of the earlier
event was strong and the methods employed in both incidents were
unusual and very similar would evidence of the prior conduct be
considered relevant to establish the identity of the perpetrator of
the crime on trial. Ordinary considerations of relevance demand
no less. So, despite the breadth of the KIPPOMIA opening in the
barrier against the use of evidence of prior "bad acts," few such
incidents in a criminal defendant's history actually have a clear
enough relationship to one of the KIPPOMIA facts to get through.
Obviously, these stringencies of relevance are appropriate.
Evidence of unrelated behavior-particularly antisocial behavior-
should not be allowed to clutter the trial; it should be excluded
unless a strong pull of inference leads directly to some material
oF CnrmaM ,L EVmENCE § 58 (5th ed. Herrick 1956); A. ABBOT, A BRIEF FOR THE
TRAL OF CRmINAL CASES § 598 (3d ed. Barbour 1925). Molineux, 168 N.Y. at
293-94, 61 N.E. at 294. Additionally, Wigmore presents a list of cases, beginning
in 1804 in England and 1829 in the United States, in which evidence of prior
crimes was admitted for purposes other than to show character. 1 WIGMoRE,
supra note 2, at 216 (3d ed. 1940); see also 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 8, § 14g
(knowledge, intent, plan or design).
For a complete discussion of the development of the American rule and its
English antecedents, see Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence:
America, 51 HAIv. L. REv. 988 (1938) (arguing the original American and English
rules were inclusionary; that is, they permitted all evidence of past crimes unless
used solely to show propensity and that only by misunderstanding and perversion
has America developed the exclusionary rule which admits prior crime evidence
only if it goes to prove motive, intent, etc.).
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trial issue. But if the strict demand of relevance is satisfied-if the
inferential flow is strong and clear, surviving the twin hazards of
prejudice and confusion of issue-should admissibility turn on
whether the material issue to which the evidence of prior miscon-
duct relates fits within the stated categories of KIPPOMIA? Does
it make sense, for example, to admit evidence of a previous knife
fight to show the defendant's motive to commit the assault in issue
(a relevant but not elemental fact), but not the commission of
the assault?
Consider another example. Suppose a certain jewelry merchant
had on a prior occasion purchased stolen diamonds at a fraction
of their value. He is now on trial for the offense of buying and
receiving stolen gems. His prior experience would probably be
admitted to show that on the second occasion he knew the stones
were stolen at the time he bought them, but not to show that he
bought them. To the ordinary human mind, struggling through
life without the benefit of a legal education, the charged act-know-
ing acquisition of the jewels-is a single indivisible piece of be-
havior; the division between the prescribed and the proscribed uses
of the fact of prior conviction may be a bit difficult to perceive.
The layman's difficulty, moreover, rests on a solid logical basis.
The evidence of prior crime is admissible to show knowledge or
the absence of mistake because a person who has once engaged in
such a transaction demonstrates or acquires a trait of character
that might be termed "criminal sophistication." Evidence of that
trait supports the supposition that the defendant was criminally
sophisticated in the transaction in question. Put more generally,
evidence of the prior crime tends to prove that a defendant's con-
duct was criminal in the case in issue because of the assumed con-
tinuity and dominance of a relevant trait of character. Precisely
the same principle would admit the evidence to prove the defend-
ant's commission of the later crime as action in conformity with
established character-the very device explicitly barred by the fed-
eral rules. It thus appears that, although an element of a crime
or aspect may be proved by evidence of prior misconduct, the
crime itself may not be. An inexplicable paradox can no longer
be denied. If possible, it should be slain while the codifiers' iron
is still hot.113
113 Those cynics, poets, or worse who do not loathe a true paradox have no
business reading publications such as this one. You do not have to understand the
Principia to appreciate why Russell, Whitehead, et al. spent a lifetime doing battle
with the inexplicable within an otherwise ordered and rational system. See gen-
erally D. HOFSTADTE, 06DEL, Escmma, BACH (1980).
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III. A SYNTHESIS AND PROPOSAL
What this all means is that meaning is missing. The conclu-
sion is inescapable: the foliage has grown off the trellis. Principles
are twisted by exceptions, rules divide and subdivide until the off-
shoots lose all familial resemblance. Moreover, the hodgepodge
cannot be passed off as a quaint residuum of a charming common
law confusion. On the criminal side, at least, the effect of one
aspect of the rule is serious injustice. In the basic business of
separating the guilty from the innocent-once thought to be the
main job of the criminal process-more substantive harm may re-
sult from the rule on impeachment by prior conviction, with all its
supposed reforms and refinements, than from any other single
feature of the system, including delay, plea bargaining, bail, sen-
tencing disparity, and the exclusionary rule. And, on both the civil
and criminal sides, charades of testimony tailored to comply with
artificial exceptions are regularly accepted while useful, meaning-
ful, and predictive evidence of character is banished. Meanwhile,
earnest lawyers are forced to resort to scholasticism and stratagem
to convert character to habit or propensity to motive and oppor-
tunity. The American rules of character evidence today do little
credit to a profession priding itself on realistic and sensible stand-
ards to encourage the production of justice from the process of
litigation.
By way of review, let us assemble the federal rules as though
they had been published by the American Law Institute as a Re-
statement. For added interest, let us look at them upside down,
as though the "exceptions" were the rule, and vice versa; thus, the
major clause will be put in the affirmative. In the best I can make
of it, the combined rules might look something like this:
I. A witness MAY testify:
A. To community REPUTATION or personal OPIN-
ION regarding character, where:
404(a)(1) 1. a pertinent trait of the accused is offered by him,
or by the prosecutor to rebut the same;
404(a)(2) 2. a pertinent trait of a crime victim is offered by the
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same,
except in rape cases;
404(a)(2) 3. the trait of "peacefulness" of the victim is offered
by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evi-
dence that the victim was the first aggressor;
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(a) with persons other than the defendant to show
defendant was not the source of semen or
injury, or
(b) with the defendant to show consent;
6. if the act was a crime for which the victim was
convicted and
(a) it was a felony and probity outweighs prejudice,
or
(b) it was an offense of any grade involving dis-
honesty or false statement.
406 C. To HABIT of a person or ROUTINE practice of an
organization to prove conduct in accordance there-
with on a particular occasion.
II. A witness MAY NOT testify, except as above:
404(a)-(b) A. Concerning any person's character, character trait, or
other crimes, wrongs, or acts, in order to prove that
he acted in conformity therewith on any particular
occasion;
412(a)-(b) B. Nor may any person give reputation, opinion, or
other evidence of the past sexual behavior of a rape
victim.
At this point, finding no better way to proceed, I should like
to extract from these ungainly rules their essence-both the best
4. the trait of veracity of a witness is attacked or sup-
ported (affirmative evidence only to rebut).
B. To specific ACTS as evidence of character:
1. for "KIPPOMIA";
2. on cross-examination generally;
3. on cross-examination specifically concerning the
trait of veracity of a witness or of another person
as to whose character the witness has testified;
4. where the trait in question is an "essential ele-
ment" of the charge, claim, or defense;
5. consisting of prior sexual behavior of a rape victim
either:
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and the worst of their complex nature. I begin with the chaff.
And here, I shall confine myself to the major flaws in the rules,
ignoring the small oddities and petty anachronisms.
(1) The conventional parade of "character witnesses"
sanctioned by the rule, offering either vague and un-
substantiated reports on general repute or personal
endorsements (usually born of friendship or obliga-
tion), adds little, if anything, of relevance to the
issues, and provides only a better chance of victory
(or escape) to the "well-connected" party.
(2) The introduction of a prior conviction is highly dam-
aging to a criminal defendant on the stand or to any
other testifying witness. With certain special and
narrow exceptions, the supposed bearing of past crimi-
nal judgment upon present veracity is tenuous at best.
Moreover, the pretense of sorting the admissible prior
convictions from the inadmissible is a sham, obedient
to no sound principle of logic or experience, and
carries serious, perhaps dispositive, consequences for
the exercise of the criminal defendant's constitutional
right to give evidence in his own behalf. The theory
of "limited use" under which such explosive evidence
is put before the jury fails to correspond to the actual
effect of the evidence even in the minds of the most
sober and conscientious jurors.
(3) The notion that enumerated special purposes provide
open avenues to receive predictive evidence without
transgressing the general ban on evidence of predis-
position is foolish. Moreover, the customary list of
such purposes is internally irrational and reveals no
principled basis to exclude alternative allowances.
The valuable core of these rules can also be expressed in three
propositions:
(1) Natural as the inference might seem to a lay observer
or juror, it would be wrong to find a fact relating to
material primary conduct (and particularly wrong to
convict a person of a crime) because of bad or similar
conduct on other occasions.
(2) When narrowly specific and nearly identical to a fact
in issue, however, prior conduct may be a reliable
index to characteristic behavior patterns that are
likely to be 'repeated in similar cricumstances. In
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these cases, the predictive value of the character evi-
dence outweighs the possibility of prejudice by im-
proper association.
(3) Difficult as it is under the most informed circum-
stances, judging the witness's credibility deserves some
information about highly pertinent background, or
history.
From these assorted conclusions, building-even in the imagi-
nation-a sensible and useful rule to govern the admission of pre-
dictive evidence is no small undertaking. A major step is to re-
construct the foundation premise. Predisposition, so long a pariah
in the law of evidence, must be reclaimed from the shadows. Its
inference has been persistent and ineradicable because our common
experience informs us that evidence of predisposition is probative.
But our Victorian sensibilities have demanded denial, and so the
influence of the banished force has been devious and distorted.
If we hope to achieve rules that make sense, and if we hope to
write rules to enhance the accuracy of the fact-finding process, we
should abandon our frayed pretense concerning the value of char-
acter evidence. A trait of character is, almost by definition, a
predisposition to characteristic conduct under appropriate circum-
stances. By open recognition in the law of this fact of life, we
should be able to place at the center of our structure the premise
that evidence of character, when relevant and more probative than
prejudicial, is admissible to prove conduct consistent with, or im-
pelled by it. If the evidence is such that the jury may infer a dis-
position to perform the conduct in issue, we should permit rather
than prohibit them from doing so.
Having installed common truth in place of strained artificiality
as the foundation stone of our reconstruction, we may commence
work on the hard part of the design-an aspect that has received
too little attention before now. Until we allow that inclination
may affect the likelihood of occurrence, we do not reach the ques-
tions what is inclination and how is it to be demonstrated. Yet
this is precisely where our attention should be directed, for this is
the core of the proper concern with the use of predictive evidence:
What provable fact-and specifically, what evidence of prior con-
duct-actually establishes that "predisposition" which will signifi-
cantly raise the probability that the behavior in issue occurred?
Not every event in a person's history bespeaks a trait of character,
nor does character always direct the repetition of behavioral pat-
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terns. We are not such neat packages of neurological potential.
Many items of conduct are wholly incidental to personality, and
loosely defined character may offer no meaningful basis for pre-
dicting action. But if the observed prior conduct is of such a
nature as to indicate that the act is dictated by personality-rooted
in disposition to perform such acts under similar conditions-similar
conduct is more likely to occur by reason thereof.
Identifying an individual as a person disposed by character to
repeat certain conduct requires a good deal more than a single
observed action. In deciding whether P crossed against the light
on April 25, for example, it is not much help to know that he had
crossed against the light last February 25, even if it happened at
the very same corner. Here, the act in question is too common-
place, and the example is too isolated to be of predictive value.
Put another way, the isolated or common item of behavior does
not constitute the evidence of individual character that might be
relevant. But if D's carpool-mate can testify that D rarely pauses
at a particular stop sign, the evidence is probative on the question
whether D stopped at that particular sign on the occasion in issue.
Similarly, the fact that the defendant had previously purchased
some sporting goods with a credit card he knew had been stolen is
relevant to the issue whether, on a later date, he forged a signature
on a check to pay for some additional athletic equipment.
The point is that, either by regular repetition of a common
act or by the performance of an unusual one, a person evinces a
characteristic manner of behaving or reacting in given circum-
stances. In the ordinary course, we are justified by our common
experience in believing that people continue to act in characteristic
ways and hence, in similar circumstances, it becomes more likely
that the predisposed defendant performed a similar act, i.e., the act
in issue. Once we can demonstrate a character trait of predictive
value, the resulting predisposition becomes highly probative.
I realize that as the special conditions of predictive value
coalesce, the potential for prejudice also rises. It is certainly easier
for the jury to disregard exculpatory defense evidence when trying
a man for strangling his girlfriend with a nylon stocking, for ex-
ample, after hearing evidence that he had attempted to strangle his
wife in the same manner a few years before. So too, a jury will
readily find that D shipped defective widgets to P in March after
learning that he had shipped widgets with the same defect to A, B,
and C in January and February. But, if we are confident in our
assessment of the predictive worth of such evidence, we need not
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fear that the obviously damaging nature of .the proof will.so .over-
flow its true probative value that it might be. fairly called "preju-
dicial."
Moreover, while calling proof of disposition by its right (and
forbidden) name, and admittedly discarding the KIPPOMIA list, I
have circumscribed tolerance with some conditions that substantially
reduce the hazard of prejudicial effects. I. would require three
threshold criteria for the admission of evidence .of. character from
proof of prior conduct to show action consistent therewith: (1) the
previous. conduct and the circumstances of its performance must be
highly specific; (2) such conduct must be clearly comparable to the
behavior and circumstances in issue; and (3) only repeated or un-
usual instances of conduct may be treated as behavior-regulating,
and hence characteristic and relevant. These are rather rigorous
tests for a piece of proffered proof to pass. I deem all three neces-
sary to enhance probative value, at the same time diminishing risk
of prejudice.
I also believe that, when it comes to something as fluid and as
readily subject to misinterpretation as. character, special care must
be taken to filter out the weak and mistaken assessments. Of the
three sources of character evidence-community repute, individual
opinion, and significant behavior-the most dangerous is the most
commonly admitted under prevailing norms: reputation. First, of
course, the convention for eliciting such evidence is often a hollow
form. A witness rarely reports on the general community regard,
as the form requires, but merely projects his personal opinion into
the hypothetical minds and conversations of an ill-defined group of
anonymous neighbors and associates." 4 But even if the character
witness in this mode of proof were actually reporting on the com-
munity view of the party's character for, let us say, pacific deport-
ment, what do we know about the behavior taken into account,
the thought processes of the assorted people, or the clarity of com-
munication employed to arrive at this consensus? Obviously, very
little. At best, the witness cannot know or say what errors, malice,
or invention fed the local rumor market. In the interests of simple
probity, then, I would not allow such reports of supposed com-
munity intelligence for any trait of character.
114 Everyone who took Evidence in law school remembers the amusing account
of President Theodore Roosevelt on the stand as a character witness as lawyers
vainly tried to keep his hearty endorsement within the forms of the reputation
rule. For the few unacquainted with the story, it may be found in D. Lomssay,
J. KArA & J. WALTz, CAsEs AND MATERALS ON Evmzucz 387-91 (3d ed. 1976).
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Evidence of character in the form of a witness's personal
opinion, now tolerated by the federal rules, is surely superior to
evidence of general repute. At least the source of the characteriza-
tion is on the stand subject to examination concerning the nature
of the supporting data and the quality of the judgment process.
Bias could be exposed and casual conclusions revealed; the fact-
finder might like to have a basis for assessing whether the proffered
evidence actually does establish character and justify the conclusion
of predisposition. So evidence in this form should be received.
Even so, caution is called for lest the character witness serve no
more enlightening function than a backslap. The hearty endorse-
ment of a prominent (or at least respectable) compurgator may be
a good way to pay off old debts, but it has about as much probative
value as a pin-striped suit. Therefore, evidence of character in
the form of personal opinion should come in only when tightly
bound to a particular and narrowly described trait in issue, and
when subject to cross-examination on the predicate facts.
Finally, consider the source of character evidence traditionally
viewed with greatest suspicion: specific instances of prior conduct.
As already indicated, here the test should be whether the prior
conduct, by its unusual nature or its regular occurrence, can be
fairly said to demonstrate a characterological predisposition to be-
have in a similar fashion under similar circumstances. But what
if the previous conduct was the basis for a criminal conviction-is
it then necessarily conduct of such importance that it indicates
character and the likelihood of repetition? Are impulses strong
enough to break social taboo also strong enough to emerge again
in behavior on subsequent occasions? Perhaps, but if so the rele-
vance and probative weight lies in the conduct, not in the fact of
criminal conviction on account thereof. Except in the rarest case,
the fact of criminal conviction adds no information of relevance
to a witness's credibility or to any other fact in issue. Apart from
the occasional efficiency of proof by a single legible piece of self-
authenticating paper, the fact that a particular item of relevant
prior conduct resulted in a conviction must be regarded as evi-
dentiary surplusage. It should not be permitted to aggravate the
relevant underlying conduct by burnishing it with official con-
demnation. Moreover, another person in another case who did the
same act without either the bad luck to be caught or the misfortune
of conviction should stand in no better position as a witness or party.
Thus, the fact that a criminal prosecution followed the rele-
vant conduct seems to me wholly irrelevant and I would not allow
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proof of the fact of conviction. Of course, proof of the underlying
criminal conduct would not be barred because of the prosecution
that followed it, regardless of its outcome. I would, however, allow
the person against whom the underlying conduct is charged to
adduce, at his option, the fact that he had been acquitted in the
criminal prosecution based upon the asserted misconduct. Although
not dispositive, surely that fact tends to confirm the defendant's
denial of the conduct attributed to him.
The evidence of prior conviction, neatly packaged for proof,
might also be used to rebut a denial of the underlying act by the
witness from the stand. When inquiry is permitted, under the
proposed reconstruction, the misconduct must be either clearly
relevant to some item of primary behavior in issue, or directly
probative of credibility. In the first instance, the matter is, by
definition, noncollateral and the general rule allows rebuttal of a
denial by extrinsic evidence. Proof of conviction for the conduct
in question is one form of such extrinsic contradiction. And the
witness-defendant or other witness can hardly complain of the
prejudicial form of the evidence that demonstrates the falsity of
his testimonial denial. If the claim is that the denial is true and
the conviction erroneous, the witness can, of course, so testify from
the stand. In the second instance, when evidence of prior mis-
conduct is offered to attack what I have termed "secondary" be-
havior (i.e., testimonial veracity), the question is more difficult.
Matter inadmissible on any issue save credibility is usually deemed
collateral and extrinsic evidence in contravention normally pre-
cluded. I have tried, however, to limit inquiry into prior mis-
conduct for purposes of attacking veracity to those situations clearly
corresponding to the testimonial circumstances. When relevant
prior misconduct is limited to fraud or deception under a duty of
truthtelling, the collaterability rule should probably bend to allow
rebuttal of a denial by extrinsic proof of a criminal conviction on
account thereof. Again, of course, the witness should be asked
about it in order to have the opportunity to explain or deny the
contradiction.
In sum, evidence of prior conviction should not be adduced
against any non-testifying person, and for those who do become
witnesses, such fact might be used only to rebut a denial of the
underlying misconduct and extrinsically introduced only upon the
witness's denial of his conviction after an opportunity to explain it.
Live, first-hand evidence of the prior conduct is obviously more
useful than the recorded fact of conviction for it. The reporting
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witness is available for examination and for challenge on the sur-
rounding context, which is vitally important to both admissibility
and to probative weight under this proposed scheme. Circum-
stances, not consequences, may enlighten a trial issue.
To this general rule, one exception might be allowed, for in
this instance only, the fact of prior criminal conviction might be
of some probative force in itself. It is surely relevant to impeach
the credibility of a testifying witness who, on a previous occasion,
had not only lied under oath, but did so in an identical setting:
from the witness stand at a criminal trial. The fact that the wit-
ness on both occasions was the defendant obviously adds to the
prejudice side of the balance, but materiality is so high that it is
difficult to discard the evidence. Proof that the witness lied as a
witness for himself as a defendant on a prior occasion would be
had by the proponent's submission that (1) the witness had so testi-
fied, (2) the substance of his testimony was necessarily inconsistent
with his guilt, and (3) he was convicted. Supporting authority is
embarrassingly scarce for what appears so logical an application of
the rule of relevance, 115 but absent a principled basis to discard
the rule, I incorporate it into my proposed scheme.
In addition, there may be occasions when someone's primary
conduct in issue involves truthtelling under duty or oath, although
the actor does not testify. Relevance is almost as high in this case,
and again it seems to me there is no good reason to exclude the
prior event at which a jury of twelve implicitly but necessarily
rejected the person's account under oath. Here again, the usual
mode of proof-extrinsic-should obtain, with the burden of demon-
strating pertinence falling upon the tendering party. Because the
115 See United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir.) (quoting Gordon
v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029
(1968)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977). In permitting introduction of prior
crimes, the court used as a factor in determining the balance between prejudice
and probative value the fact that the defendant had testified at the trial that
resulted in his conviction.
In Gordon, Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger wrote:
The relevance of prior convictions to credibility may well be different
as between a case where the conviction of the accused was by admission
of guilt by a plea and on the other hand a case where the accused
affirmatively contested the charge and testified, for example, that he was
not present and did not commit the acts charged. In the latter situation
the accused affirmatively puts his own veracity in issue when he testifies
so that the jury's verdict amounted to rejection of his testimony; the
verdict is in a sense a de facto finding that the accused did not tell the
truth when sworn to do so. Exploration of this area risks a diversion
which may well be time consuming; hence use of this inquiry should be
limited.
383 F.2d at 940 n.8.
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relevant fact is the asserted inconsistency between prior testimony
and prior verdict, it may be possible to adduce the fact without
reference to the crime for which the present witness was previously
convicted. On a sufficient foundation, laid out of the jury's presence,
the court might judicially notice necessary facts without allowing
extraneous and prejudicial material to come in with it. Or counsel
might work out a satisfactory stipulation. It is probably a rare
case; discretion may be called for.
Perhaps it would be useful at this point to sketch my proposal
in the form of a statutory model. I submit it only by way of legal
shorthand, knowing that the breeze of challenge and justification is
required to make any of its components fly.
I. As to Primary Conduct
When otherwise competent and relevant, and in ac-
cordance with the following rules, evidence of character
shall be admissible against any party or other person
whose prior conduct is a material issue.
A. Such evidence of character may be given by ex-
trinsic evidence concerning:
(1) opinion, but only as to the trait of rectitude
or other traits narrowly defined and modified by cir-
cumstances closely resembling the situation in issue;
(2) specific instances of prior conduct, but only
by repeated, habitual, or unusual incidents of similar
behavior in similar circumstances. Provided, how-
ever, that if the person in question testifies before
such evidence is offered, the party intending to intro-
duce it must first question the witness concerning the
prior incidents. If the prior conduct is admitted in
all pertinent particulars, extrinsic evidence of the
same shall be excluded as cumulative.
B. The fact that otherwise relevant prior conduct
formed the basis for a criminal prosecution is immaterial,
(1) and the fact that the defendant in the prior
prosecution was convicted shall not be admitted in
evidence,
(2) but the fact that the prior prosecution re-
sulted in acquittal, or that a conviction thereon was
reversed for insufficient evidence, shall be admitted
at the instance of the person whose character is being
attacked;
1982]
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(3) if the material conduct in issue involves the
duty of a person to render a truthful account, and if
such person testified previously as a defendant in a
manner necessarily inconsistent with guilt and was
thereupon convicted, the court in its discretion may
allow such facts in evidence in a manner designed to
minimize possible prejudice.
II. As to Secondary Conduct
Evidence of character shall be admissible on the issue
of veracity of any testifying witness in accordance with
the following rules. Such evidence may be obtained by:
A. Examination or cross-examination concerning:
(1) specific instances or prior conduct involving
truthtelling under oath or duty, or
(2) prior criminal conviction after trial at which
the witness testified as a defendant in his or her be-
half in a manner inconsistent with the verdict.
B. Extrinsic evidence, by opinion, or specific in-
stances of behavior concerning only the trait of truth-
telling under duty.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, character evidence cannot and should not be banished
from the field of proof. Humans have always sought to read one
another's character and often base important decisions on these
judgments. Inescapably, character does tend to prove a fact to
which it may be relevant by establishing a proclivity or tendency
to do the act in question or to perform with a critical intelligence
or understanding. Yet today, character evidence most often ap-
pears either in burlesque of its function, or as a product of an
arcane legalistic wordplay, or as a cruel and senseless shard of
forgotten dogma. It is foolish to exclude helpful evidence simply
because it tends to prove the fact by proving predisposition to
perform it. Relevant is relevant. At the same time, character as a
basis for inferring conduct consistent with it is notoriously subject
to the abuses of baseless gossip, errant conclusion, and downright
malice, and the law of evidence too has become the captive of these
wayward conjectures. Rules and restrictions have proliferated in
defiance of the efforts to restore some order and reliability to the
patch of the law of evidence. Stern discipline and brave departure
are called for. Simple reliance on relevance principles will not
[Vol. 130:845
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tame these recurring problems. Yet, there is much in the common
wisdom of character prediction that merits preservation and appli-
cation to the difficult business of factfinding. With a bit of effort
to find the sturdy precepts and to cut loose the facile accretions
and the meaningless circumscriptions, I believe it is possible for
drafters, who are today engaged in the good work of codification
for the states, to construct a good rule, despite the poor example
set by the federal rules.
